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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from convictions on thirteen counts of possessing a controlled 
substance precursor, all second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 58-37c-3(12)(k) and 58-37c-l 1(2), in the Seventh Judicial District, Emery County, the 
Honorable Bryce K. Bryner presiding.1 This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Defendant claims that the trial court deprived him of his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel at trial. Where defendant has failed to provide this Court with an 
adequate record upon which to review his claim, must this Court assume the regularity of 
the proceedings below? 
No standard of review applies to this issue. 
1
 Unless otherwise stated, all citations to the code are to the West 2004 
publication. 
2. Was pretrial counsel ineffective for not pursuing a motion to suppress 
defendant's confession based on defendant's unsupported claims that (a) his arrest was 
illegal and (b) he invoked the right to counsel during the police interrogation? 
Defendant claims for the first time on appeal that his confession followed an 
illegal arrest and that pretrial counsel failed to seek suppression on this basis. "An 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal, presents a 
question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25,1f 6, 89 P.3d 162. 
Defendant claimed in a motion for a new trial that police officers continued to 
interrogate him after he invoked the right to counsel and that pretrial counsel failed to 
seek suppression on this basis. Where an ineffective assistance claim is first raised in a 
motion for a new trial, this Court reviews the trial court's decision to deny the motion for 
an abuse of discretion. See State v. Eisner, 2001 UT 99, If 31, 37 P.3d 1073 (citation 
omitted). This Court "assume[s] that the trial court exercised proper discretion unless the 
record clearly shows the contrary." State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, ^ 25, 20 P.3d 265 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statute is reproduced in context in Addendum A: 
"Unlawful conduct" as defined in Section 58-1-501 includes knowingly and 
intentionally . . . obtaining or attempting to obtain or to possess any 
controlled substance precursor or any combination of controlled substance 
precursors knowing or having a reasonable cause to believe that the 
controlled substance precursor is intended to be used in the unlawful 
manufacture of any controlled substance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-3(12)(k). 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 6, 2003, defendant was charged by information with a second-degree 
felony for possessing a controlled substance precursor in violation of the Controlled 
Substance Precursor Act. Rl. At his initial appearance, the trial court advised defendant 
of the charges and penalties against him and of his right to counsel. R3. Defendant said 
that he would hire his own attorney. See R3-4 (Minutes, reproduced in Addendum B). 
He retained Margret Sidwell Taylor to represent him, and she appeared for him on 
February 4, 2003. Rll-12. On May 5, 2003, the State filed an amended information 
charging defendant with seventeen counts of possessing a controlled substance precursor 
in violation of the Act. R27-31. Trial was set for November 18, 2004. R270. 
On November 17, 2004, Ms. Taylor informed the court that the parties had 
reached a plea agreement. R280. When the parties appeared the following day, however, 
the court found that defendant was not prepared to enter a guilty plea. Id. Ms. Taylor 
moved to withdraw as counsel, and the court granted her request, as "there appear[ed] to 
be a conflict between the defendant] and his counsel." Id. The court reset the jury trial 
for January 26, 2005, and ordered that defendant appear with new counsel on December 
7,2004. Id. No transcript of the proceeding is included in the record. iSreeR279-81 
(Minutes, reproduced in Addendum B). 
On December 7, 2004, D. Bruce Oliver entered his appearance as counsel. R286. 
That same day, defendant appeared before the court, the court found that he had 
employed Mr. Oliver, and the court set a further pretrial hearing for January 4, 2005. 
3 
R288-89. No transcript of the proceeding is included in the record. See R288-89 
(Minutes, reproduced in Addendum B). 
On December 16, 2004, Mr. Oliver moved to withdraw as counsel, stating that he 
had not received a retainer and that he had not been able to communicate with defendant 
since December 7, 2004. R300. 
On December 21, 2004, the court held another hearing on the matter. R302. 
Defendant, who could not be found, was not present. R3 02-03. No transcript of the 
proceeding is included in the record. See id. (Minutes, reproduced in Addendum B). 
On January 4, 2005, the court held a pretrial conference. R309. Defendant was 
present. Id. The court advised defendant of Mr. Oliver's motion to withdraw, questioned 
defendant about it, and found based on his answers that Mr. Oliver had withdrawn 
"because the defendant failed to keep in touch with him." R310. The court further found 
that defendant had fulltime employment and did not qualify for a public defender. Id. 
"The Court urged the defendant to do whatever it takes to secure counsel for himself." 
Id. No transcript of the proceeding is included in the record. See R309-10 (Minutes, 
reproduced in Addendum B). 
On January 19, 2005, the trial court held a pretrial conference. R319. Defendant 
appeared and "informed the court that he ha[d] not hired counsel." R319-20. The court 
told defendant that the trial would "go forward as set to begin on January 26 and 27, 
2005." Id. The court also found that defendant "ha[d] had ample time to hire counsel." 
Id. No transcript of the proceeding is included in the record. See R319-20 (Minutes, 
reproduced in Addendum B). 
4 
Trial was held January 26, 27, and 28, 2005. R331-42. The court noted that no 
defense counsel was present and asked defendant whether he had hired an attorney to 
represent him. R543:5. Defendant stated that he had not. Id. The court also noted that 
defendant had faxed an affidavit of indigency to the court just before midnight on January 
24, 2005. R543:5. The court found the affidavit, filed "essentially one day before the 
trial," was late. R543:7, 11. Moreover, it was incomplete. Id. Defendant had not 
completed "the very first question" which asked "who [his] employer [wa]s, what [his] 
monthly net income [wa]s, and what [his] monthly gross income [wa]s." R543:6. 
The court further noted that only three weeks before on January 4, 2005, it had 
found that defendant was employed full-time and "suggested on the record that [he] did 
not qualify for a [p]ublic [d]efender." R543:l 1. The court observed, however, that at the 
January 19, 2005 hearing, the court had "advised the defendant that he could file an 
affidavit of indigency, but that it would have to be done immediately." Id. Instead, "one 
day before the trial, the defendant filed an affidavit. But once again, the affidavit was not 
complete." Id. 
The court found that "the defendant ha[d] had ample time to employ counsel" and 
"ample opportunity to submit an affidavit... requesting that counsel be appointed, if he 
could not [afford] counsel." Id. The court concluded that it "just ha[d] no other option 
but to go ahead with the t r ia l . . . at th[at] time." Id. 
The State then filed a second amended information, reducing the charges against 
the defendant from seventeen counts to thirteen counts. R327-30, 593:13-14. Trial 
proceeded and the jury returned guilty verdicts on all thirteen counts. R379-80. On 
5 
March 16, 2005, the court entered judgment, sentencing defendant to thirteen concurrent 
prison terms of one-to-fifteen years. R405-06. 
On March 24, 2005, defendant filed a motion for a new trial. R408-26 (Motion for 
New Trial and Memorandum Supporting Motion for New Trial, reproduced in 
Addendum C). Defendant claimed, among other things, that the trial was unfair because 
the court "forced [him] to act as his own attorney." R420. He claimed, more 
specifically, that the trial court had led him "to believe that counsel would be appointed 
for him at trial by his submission of an affidavit of indigency immediately'' R421 
(emphasis in original). He also claimed that pretrial counsel Taylor was deficient for 
abandoning a motion to suppress. R418. He claimed that he requested an attorney while 
being interrogated, but that the officers proceeded without addressing his request. Id. 
On May 27, 2005, the trial court denied the motion. R522-27 (Ruling on Motion 
for New Trial, reproduced in Addendum C). The court rejected defendant's claim that 
he had been improperly forced to act as his own attorney and found that he "ha[d] not 
provided a transcript, affidavit, or other evidence to support this assertion" that the trial 
court had misled him. R526. The court stated, "[A]fter Ms. Margret Taylor's services 
were terminated on November 18, 2004, the court ordered defendant to appear before the 
court on several occasions to advise the court on his progress on hiring counsel. Each 
time the court admonished. . . the importance of employing counsel but defendant 
procrastinated the hiring of counsel even though he was working in the coal mines." Id. 
(emphasis added). The court also found that defendant did not request an attorney 
during his interrogation. R523. On June 13, 2005, defendant appealed. R529. 
6 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The crime 
On thirteen different occasions between September 1999 and December 2002, 
defendant purchased large quantities of crystal iodine from the Emery Animal Health 
Clinic, a veterinary hospital. R543:49-50, 545:10-12. The clinic kept a record of the 
transactions. R343, 543:49, 55, 57. Defendant purchased approximately two pounds of 
crystal iodine in 2001 and approximately nine pounds in 2002. R544:34, 37-38. 
Defendant admitted to a police officer that he resold some of the iodine for use in the 
manufacture of methamphetamine, that he made a profit, and that he took the sales price 
in cash or in methamphetamine. R496-97. 
Defendant's version 
Defendant claimed that he confessed out of fear. R544:23-24. He testified that he 
was a licensed farrier (blacksmith) and bought the iodine only for use in re-shoeing 
horses. R544:13. He claimed it could be used for laminitis (inflammation of the hoof) 
and for thrush. R544:18, 20. He claimed that the large quantities he purchased could be 
explained in various ways, i.e., he misplaced the iodine and had to buy more, 
R544:24-25; someone else purchased some of the iodine using his name, R544:34; 
someone stole iodine from his truck, R544:27; and he spilled iodine when shoeing the 
horses. R544:65. 
Rebuttal to defendant's version 
The State cross-examined defendant regarding his claim that he was a licensed 
farrier. R544:15. Defendant conceded that he was not licensed as a farrier in Utah and 
7 
did not claim to be licensed in any other state. R544:16. He merely claimed to have 
completed a six-week farrier training course. Id. 
Farrier Leonard Rogers testified for the State. R543:81. Rogers testified that an 
iodine/turpentine mixture is sometimes used to harden a horse's hoof when the hoof has 
been cut too short. R543:84-85. He did not use iodine for that purpose, nor did any of 
the other farriers that he knew, as other products worked better and crystal iodine could 
"founder [disable or lame] a horse.'5 R543:86, 88. He had never heard of crystal iodine 
being used for thrush. R543:85. He testified that, if used for hardening a hoof, a quarter 
of an ounce of crystal iodine would suffice. R543:87. Asked if he could imagine "any 
occasion where a person, a farrier might want—need to use nine pounds of crystal iodine 
in a—one-year time period," he answered, "No." R543:88. Asked again, "Any 
conceivable way that you could use that in a year," he again answered, "No." Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Despite repeated warnings that trial would proceed even if he did not obtain 
counsel, defendant appeared for trial without having retained an attorney and without 
having completed an affidavit of indigency. The court found that he had had ample 
opportunity to hire counsel or to establish indigency and required him to proceed pro se. 
Defendant claims that he did not voluntarily and knowingly waive his right to counsel 
and the trial court unconstitutionally deprived him of his right to counsel. Defendant has 
not provided an adequate record upon which this Court may review his claim. 
The limited record defendant has provided on appeal does not support his claim. 
Rather, it indicates that the trial court repeatedly warned defendant of the consequences 
8 
of continued dilatory conduct. It also suggests that the court warned defendant of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. 
More significantly, however, because of the limited nature of the record, defendant 
is fatally handicapped in asserting trial court error. He has not included in the record 
transcripts of any of the hearings during which the court discussed with him the need to 
either retain counsel or establish indigency and in which the court admonished him of the 
importance of employing counsel. This Court must therefore presume the regularity of 
the proceedings below. It must assume that the trial court advised defendant that it would 
treat continuing failure to retain counsel and refusal to provide affidavit support for a 
claim of indigency as a request to proceed pro se, making defendant's waiver voluntary. 
It must also assume that the court explained to defendant the dangers and disadvantages 
of self-representation, making the waiver knowing and intelligent. 
Defendant also claims that pretrial counsel, who filed a motion to suppress but did 
not file a memorandum in support of the motion, was ineffective for not pursuing it. 
Defendant asserts that, had pretrial counsel pursued a motion to suppress, the State would 
have been barred from using his confession at trial. He claims, specifically, that his 
confession was unlawfully obtained because (1) it followed an illegal arrest and 
(2) sometime during the police interrogation he invoked the right to counsel. 
Defendant's arrest, however, was lawful. The officers who effected the arrest had 
probable cause to believe that defendant had committed two offenses: obtaining a 
controlled substance precursor with the intent that it be used in the unlawful manufacture 
of methamphetamine, and driving an unregistered vehicle. Further, defendant, who 
9 
agreed to talk with the officers after they gave him his Miranda warnings, did not invoke 
the right to counsel during the police interrogation. Pursuing a motion to suppress would 
therefore have been futile. As counsel is not required to make futile motions and 
requests, pretrial counsel did not perform deficiently when she abandoned the motion to 
suppress. Moreover, defendant was not prejudiced. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT CLAIMS THAT THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED 
HIM OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL; BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS 
NOT PROVIDED THIS COURT WITH AN ADEQUATE RECORD 
UPON WHICH TO REVIEW HIS CLAIM, THIS COURT SHOULD 
PRESUME THE REGULARITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant claims that the trial court deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel at trial. Br. Aplt. at l.2 He claims that the court "forced [him] to represent 
himself, without either the benefit of counsel or a knowing intelligent waiver of 
assistance of counsel." Id. Defendant's claim fails because he has not provided this 
Court with an adequate record to support his allegations. 
A. By his conduct, a defendant may voluntarily waive the right to counsel. The 
trial court must ensure, however, that the waiver is knowing and intelligent. 
A defendant may waive the right to counsel by affirmatively seeking permission to 
represent himself or by engaging in conduct which the court treats as a request to proceed 
2
 Defendant also claims that "counsel inappropriately waived [his] right to a 
preliminary hearing without his consent or knowledge" and "her personal agenda to 
legalize drugs actually resulted in additional charges against him in the State's two 
amended informations." Br. Aplt. at 33. Defendant does not develop these claims, and 
the State does not address them. 
10 
pro se. Most waiver cases involve affirmative representations, or true waiver. This case 
involves waiver by conduct, also called implied waiver. 
True waiver. A defendant may "affirmatively request[] permission to proceed 
pro se." State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, \ 28. This is a true waiver, "the most common 
method by which defendants forsake their right to counsel." Id. "When a defendant 
requests to proceed pro se, his waiver will be valid only if he acts knowingly and 
intelligently, being aware of the dangers inherent in self-representation." Id. at f^ 29. The 
defendant must be "'made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, 
so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made 
with eyes open.'" State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting 
Faretta v. California, All U.S. 806, 835 (1975)). 
"The most reliable way for a trial court to determine whether a defendant is aware 
of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation is to engage in a colloquy on the 
record." Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, \ 29. A defendant may, however, under the 
circumstances of a particular case, knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel 
A defendant may also forfeit his right to counsel. "Unlike waiver, 'forfeiture 
results in the loss of a right regardless of the defendant's knowledge thereof and 
irrespective of whether the defendant intended to relinquish the right.'" State v. 
Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, % 31 (quoting United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100 (3d 
Cir. 1995)). "[A] defendant may be deemed to have forfeited his right to counsel when 
he engages in 'extremely dilatory conduct' or abusive behavior, such as physically 
assaulting counsel." Id. at ^ 32 (quoting Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1101). When a defendant 
engages in conduct extreme enough "to constitute forfeiture, a court need not determine 
whether a defendant understands the risks of self-representation or warn him that he will 
lose his right to counsel." Id. 
11 
even without a colloquy. Id. Where there is no colloquy, the reviewing court "will look 
at any evidence in the record which shows a defendant's actual awareness of the risks of 
proceeding pro se." State v. Valencia, 2001 UT App 159, % 22, 27 P.3d 573 (citing State 
v. Frampton, 137 P.2d 183, 188 (Utah 1987)); see also State v. Hassan, 2004 UT 99, 
f 22, 108 P.3d 695 (recommending colloquy, but stating that court will "look at any 
evidence in the record which shows a defendant's actual awareness of the risks of 
proceeding pro se"). 
Waiver by conduct or implied waiver. A defendant may also waive his right to 
counsel by his conduct. This is "often referred to as implied waiver." Pedockie, 2006 
UT 28, f 33. "'Once a defendant has been warned that he will lose his attorney if he 
engages in dilatory tactics, any misconduct thereafter may be treated as an implied 
request to proceed pro se and thus, as a waiver of the right to counsel.'" Id. (quoting 
United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100 (3d Cir. 1995)). "[A] defendant need not 
intend to relinquish the right to counsel." Id. But "he must have been warned that 
continuation of the unacceptable conduct will result in a waiver of the right to counsel." 
Id. 
One of the most common circumstances giving rise to waiver by conduct is the 
failure of a defendant to retain counsel after having been warned that trial will proceed 
even if he does not do so.4 When a defendant "fail[s] to secure an attorney for trial," 
4
 See United State v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992) ("the combination 
of ability to pay for counsel plus refusal to do so does waive the right to counsel at trial" 
and constitutes "waiver by conduct"); United States v Kelm, 827 F.2d 1319, 1322 (9th 
12 
despite having been "given ample time and [having been] warned to obtain an attorney," 
the defendant's failure to act "should be treated as a request to proceed pro se." Id. at 
If 35 (citing United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 166-67 (10th Cir. 1980). 
Sometimes a defendant will assert that he cannot afford to hire an attorney, but 
refuse to provide the court with evidence establishing that he is indigent. Failure to 
provide evidence of indigency, despite having been given ample opportunity to do so and 
warned that it is a prerequisite to appointment of counsel, can result in waiver by conduct 
of the right to appointed counsel. See McAfee v. City of Muscle Shoals, 652 So.2d 330, 
Cir. 1987) (concluding that continued refusal to retain counsel or to accept appointed 
counsel, in an attempt to cause delay, constituted a waiver of counsel); United States v. 
Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 167 (10th Cir. 1980) (concluding that defendant had a 
reasonable opportunity to retain counsel, that he was made aware of the dangers of self-
representation, and that his "stubborn failure to hire an attorney constituted a knowing 
and intelligent waiver of the right to assistance of counsel"); Monte v. State, 690 So. 2d 
517, 519 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that nonindigent defendant's failure to retain 
counsel within a reasonable time supported finding that he waived his right to counsel); 
Siniardv. State, 491 So. 2d 1062, 1063-64 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (concluding that "a 
defendant able to retain counsel is entitled to a reasonable time to secure counsel," but 
"he may not indefinitely postpone trial by continued applications for more time to seek 
representation" and "[w]hether additional time should be granted is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); State v. 
Morrison, 723 A.2d 869, 870 (Me. 1998) ("Once it is determined that the defendant has 
the means to retain counsel, his seemingly stubborn failure to hire an attorney may 
constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver."); Painter v. State, 762 P.2d 990, 992 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1988) (concluding that "[fjailure to hire an attorney may constitute a knowing 
and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel if done to delay the hearing" and that "[t]he 
right to assistance of counsel may not be put to service as a means of delaying or trifling 
with the court") (citations omitted); State v. Jacobs, 245 S.E.2d 606, 607-08 (S.C. 1978) 
(per curiam) (holding that defendant waived his right to counsel by failing to retain 
attorney even though he was financially capable, he was given reasonable time, and the 
court advised him to do so). 
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331 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (holding that defendant's failure to submit affidavit of 
indigency precluded finding that he was entitled to be represented by appointed counsel). 
Sometimes a defendant will fail to secure an attorney after being warned that he 
will have to proceed at trial without one and also fail to provide any proof of indigency, 
despite having been given adequate opportunity to do so. In such circumstances, a 
defendant's failure to act may result in waiver by conduct of the right to appointed 
counsel and the right to retained counsel. See United States v. Loy, 164 Fed. Appx. 747, 
754, 758 (10th Cir. 2006) (reproduced in Addendum D) (holding that defendant waived 
his right to counsel when, after being warned of the need for an attorney, he failed to hire 
one, and concluding that waiver was valid even though, had defendant adequately 
disclosed his financial circumstances in a timely fashion, he may have qualified for 
appointed counsel). 
In all of these circumstances, the trial court may treat defendant's conduct as a 
request to proceed pro se. Waiver is voluntary not because the defendant intended to 
waive representation, but because he voluntarily engaged in the misconduct even though 
the court had warned him of the consequences. 
An implied waiver, like a true waiver, in addition to being voluntary, must also be 
"knowing and intelligent." Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, f 33 (citing Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 
1102). In other words, in addition to knowing the consequences of continued 
misconduct, the defendant must "possess [] an awareness of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation at the time of the implied waiver." Id. 
14 
"[T]he trial court must ensure that the defendant is cognizant of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation" and that his waiver is therefore knowing and 
intelligent. Id. at f 38. The most reliable way for the trial court to do this is by 
conducting a colloquy, "comparable in content to the warning given to a defendant who 
affirmatively asserts his right to self-representation." Id. at f 38 & n.40. However, a 
waiver can be knowing and intelligent even in circumstances where there is no colloquy. 
See id. at 129. In those circumstances, the reviewing court "will look at any evidence in 
the record which shows a defendant's actual awareness of the risks of proceeding pro se." 
Valencia, 2001 UT App 159, If 22 (citation omitted). 
B. A defendant claiming error must provide an adequate record on appeal to 
support his allegations. In the face of an inadequate record, a reviewing 
court must assume the regularity of the proceedings below. 
"Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and 
responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate record." State v. Wetzel, 868 
P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 
1998). "Thus, the appellant has the burden of providing the reviewing court with an 
adequate record on appeal to prove his allegations." Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 
P.2d 1049, 1052 (Utah App. 1990); accord State v. Wuljfenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 
1982). "[Speculative assignments of error not supported by the record do not constitute 
grounds for reversal." State v. Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, f 20, 56 P.3d 969 (citing 
State v. Kirkwood, 2002 UT App 128, 47 P.3d 111). 
Indeed, an appellant is "fatally handicapped" if he does not provide an adequate 
record on appeal. State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, % 13, 69 P.3d 1278. "[W]hen an 
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appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, [a reviewing court] presume[s] 
the regularity of the proceedings below." Id.; see also State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 
699 (Utah App. 1995) (assuming regularity of the proceedings below because appellant 
failed to include transcript on appeal). "'When crucial matters are not included in the 
record, the missing portions are presumed to support the action of the trial court.'" 
Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, % 13 (quoting State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988)). 
C. The record is inadequate to permit review defendant's claim, and this Court 
must assume the regularity of the proceedings below. This Court must 
assume that the trial court adequately warned defendant of both the 
consequences of continued dilatory conduct and the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation. 
Defendant claims that he could not have voluntarily and knowingly waived the 
right to counsel because the trial court did not warn him of the consequences of continued 
dilatory conduct or the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. See Br. Aplt. at 
33. While the limited record on appeal supports a conclusion that the trial court properly 
warned defendant, the record defendant has presented is inadequate to permit review of 
his claim. Where the record is inadequate, this Court must presume that "the missing 
portions . . . support the action of the trial court." Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ^ 13. As a 
result, defendant is "fatally handicapped" in asserting his claim. Id. 
1. Voluntary waiver by conduct. 
Here, the existing record shows that trial court discussed with defendant the need 
to retain counsel or to demonstrate indigency so that counsel could be appointed. These 
discussions began at defendant's initial appearance on January 7, 2003 when the trial 
court advised defendant of the right to counsel and defendant indicated he would hire his 
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own counsel. R3. Defendant retained Margret Taylor, who appeared in February 2003 
and served until November 2004. Rl 1-12, 279-80. At a hearing on November 18, 2004, 
Ms. Taylor asked to withdraw, and the court granted her request. R279-80. The minute 
entry states that the court discussed the matter of new counsel with defendant on that 
date. R280. The discussions continued through a series of hearings on December 7, 
2004, and January 4 and January 19, 2005. R280, 289, 310, 320. The minute entries 
indicate that the trial court "urged the defendant to do whatever it t[ook] to secure 
counsel for himself and repeatedly explained to defendant that the trial would proceed as 
scheduled and that it was his responsibility to retain counsel. R310, 320. 
The record does not indicate that defendant asserted any change in his financial 
circumstances after the initial hearing where he indicated he would hire his own attorney. 
Moreover, only three weeks before trial, the court found that defendant was employed 
fulltime and did not qualify for a public defender. R310. When defendant again 
appeared without counsel one week before trial, the court noted that he had had ample 
time to retain an attorney and informed him that trial would go forward. R320. 
Nevertheless, even at that late date, the court noted that if defendant wanted to 
claim indigency and have counsel appointed, he could do so. R332, 543:11. He could 
still "file an affidavit of indigency, b u t . . . it would have to be done immediately" 
543:11 (emphasis added); see also R332. 
Defendant neither retained counsel nor timely filed an affidavit of indigency. 
R332. He filed an affidavit on January 24, 2005, just before midnight, and essentially 
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one day before trial. The affidavit, however, was incomplete and did not list defendant's 
employer, his gross income, or his net income. R543:6. 
When defendant appeared without counsel on the morning of trial, the trial court 
found that defendant's affidavit of indigency was incomplete and untimely. R543:11. 
The court stated that defendant had had "ample time to employ counsel" and "ample 
opportunity to submit an affidavit... requesting that counsel be appointed, if he could 
not [afford] counsel." Id.5 
Thus, the limited record supports a determination that the trial court warned 
defendant of the consequences of continuing dilatory conduct and that, by his continuing 
misconduct, defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel. In any event, defendant is 
"fatally handicapped" in asserting that the trial court did not warn him of the 
consequences that would follow continued dilatory conduct. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, \ 13. 
Defendant has not presented a record adequate to support review of his claim. He has not 
included in the record transcripts of any of the hearings in which the court advised him of 
5
 Defendant suggests that the trial court acted improperly when it required 
defendant to represent himself because "two days later on January 28, 2005, the trial 
court found [him] indigent for sentencing and . . . . appointed counsel. . . because he 
couldn't afford an attorney." Br. Aplt. at 22-23. At that point, however, the jury had 
returned guilty verdicts and defendant's circumstances had changed. See R340-41. The 
minutes state, "The Court could not appoint counsel on the first day of trial because it 
found the application was not timely filed. At this time, because the defendant] is 
incarcerated, the Court finds he qualifies for the public defender...." R341 (emphasis 
added). The court could reasonably have assumed at this point that defendant, who was 
incarcerated, could no longer pursue gainful employment and therefore would qualify for 
a public defender. In addition, with the judge's assistance, defendant had finally 
completed and submitted an affidavit of indigency. See R344-46. 
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his right to counsel, urged him to retain counsel, gave him an opportunity to file an 
affidavit of indigency, and informed him of the consequences of continued dilatory 
conduct. See R3-4, 279-81, 288-89, 302-03, 309-10, 319-20. Thus, this Court must 
assume the regularity of the proceedings below. This Court must assume that the trial 
court adequately warned defendant of the consequences of his failure to retain counsel or 
establish indigency and that his waiver was voluntary. 
2. Knowing and intelligent waiver. 
The existing record indicates that the trial court discussed with defendant not only 
the need for counsel, but the importance of counsel. As stated, the trial court discussed 
these matters in hearings on January 7, 2003, November 18, 2004, December 7, 2004, 
January 4, 2005, and January 19, 2005. As also stated, "[A]fter Ms. Margret Taylor's 
services were terminated on November 18, 2004, the court ordered defendant to appear 
before the court on several occasions and advise the court on his progress in hiring 
counsel." R526. The court continued, "Each time the court admonished. . . the 
importance of employing counsel but defendant procrastinated the hiring of counsel even 
though he was working in the coal mines." Id. (emphasis added). 
These statements suggest that the court properly warned defendant of the dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation. In any event, defendant is again "fatally 
handicapped" in asserting that the trial court erred. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24,113. 
Defendant has not presented a record upon which this Court can review his claim that the 
trial court failed to adequately warning him of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation. Defendant has not included in the record transcripts of the hearings in 
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which the court "admonished . . . the importance of employing counsel." R523. Thus, 
this Court must assume the regularity of the proceedings below. This Court must assume 
that the trial court adequately warned defendant of the consequences of dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation and that his waiver was knowing and intelligent. 
II. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT PRETRIAL 
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT PURSUING A MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS OR THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING HIS MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
BASED ON HIS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM 
"An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal, 
presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 6, 89 P.3d 162. On the other 
hand, where the claim is first raised in a motion for a new trial, this court reviews the trial 
court's decision to deny the motion for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Bisner, 2001 
UT 99,1 31, 37 P.3d 1073 (citation omitted). This Court "assume[s] that the trial court 
exercised proper discretion unless the record clearly shows the contrary." State v. 
Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, \ 25, 20 P.3d 265 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
To establish an ineffective assistance claim, a "defendant must show: (1) that 
counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) a reasonable probability exists 
that but for the deficient conduct defendant would have obtained a more favorable 
outcome." Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6 (citing State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 
1996); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Counsel's failure "to make 
motions or objections [that] would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective 
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assistance." State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, \ 34, 989 P.2d 52 (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
Defendant claims that "[h]ad counsel been effective, [his] alleged confession 
would have been suppressed by way of pre-trial motion and hearing." Br. Aplt. at 32.6 
Specifically, defendant first claims that the officers who arrested him lacked probable 
cause to support the arrest, that his confession was the fruit of an unlawful arrest, and that 
his pretrial counsel should have raised this matter in a motion to suppress. Br. Aplt. at 
20, 23-24. He claims this basis for his ineffective assistance claim for the first time on 
appeal. He must therefore show as a matter of law that counsel's performance was 
deficient and he was prejudiced. 
Defendant next claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to 
suppress his confession on the basis that police interrogated him after he invoked the 
right to counsel. Br. Aplt. at 25. While defendant concedes that that he agreed to talk to 
officers after they gave him his Miranda warnings, he claims that sometime during the 
interrogation he invoked his right to counsel. Id. at 24-25. Defendant originally made 
this claim in his motion for a new trial, and the trial court denied it. R417-18, 523-54. 
6
 Defendant also asserts that pretrial counsel was ineffective for "waiv[ing] his 
preliminary hearing." Br. Aplt. at 31. He apparently claims that, had she not waived the 
preliminary hearing, his charges would have been limited to one second degree felony, 
and crime laboratory expert Jennifer McNair would not have been permitted to testify 
concerning the toxicology report prepared by Kevin Smith. Br. Aplt. at 30-31. 
Defendant does not develop these claims. He does not explain why counsel's 
performance was deficient nor why it was prejudicial. The State therefore does not 
address them. 
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He must therefore show that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion for a new trial based on this claim. 
Because pretrial counsel abandoned the motion to suppress, the court conducted 
no suppression hearing. The facts regarding the arrest and the interrogation are therefore 
taken from the pleadings files and from the trial transcripts. They show that defendant's 
arrest was supported by probable cause. They also show that he did not invoke the right 
to counsel during the police interrogation. 
A. The arrest was supported by probable cause. 
An arrest is lawful when it is supported by probable cause. "[PJrobable cause 
justifying an arrest" requires "'facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge 
that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, 
in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to 
commit an offense.'" State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, ^ 27, 57 P.3d 1052 (quoting Michigan 
v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)). The determination of whether a law enforcement 
officer has probable cause to arrest someone without a warrant "should be made on an 
objective standard: whether from the facts known to the officer, and the inferences [that 
can] fairly . . . be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in [the officer's] 
position would be justified in believing that the suspect had committed the offense." Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
7
 If this "record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies 
resulting therefrom simply [should] be construed in favor of a finding that counsel 
performed effectively." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 17, 12 P.3d 92. Defendant 
has the burden to provide an adequate record on appeal. See id. 
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Deputy Greg Funk testified at trial that Colleen Davis, an employee of the Emery 
Animal Health Clinic, called him in December 2002 to report that defendant had been 
purchasing crystal iodine "on quite a regular basis in . . . pound quantities." R543:63. 
Deputy Funk told Ms. Davis to contact him before selling any additional iodine to 
defendant. Id. On December 26, 2002, Ms. Davis called Deputy Funk to report that 
defendant had placed another order for iodine. Id. When defendant arrived at the clinic, 
Ms. Davis again called Detective Funk. Id. 
Detective Funk drove to the clinic and entered just as the transaction was being 
completed. R543:64-65. He saw defendant receiving money, apparently change, but did 
not see the bottle of iodine. R543:65. Defendant left the clinic, and Detective Funk 
re-entered and confirmed with Ms. Davis that defendant had just purchased iodine. Id. 
Detective Funk then called dispatch, and dispatch called Sergeant Gayle Jensen and told 
him to stop defendant's vehicle. Id. 
Sergeant Jensen arrived at the Emery Animal Health Clinic just as defendant was 
pulling out. R543:77. As he followed defendant, he ran a check on the truck's license 
plates. Id, The check revealed that the registration had been revoked. Id, Moreover, he 
had knowledge of defendant's iodine purchases. Id. Sergeant Jensen therefore stopped 
defendant for two purposes: one, for driving a vehicle with a revoked registration, and, 
two, for purchasing a large quantity of iodine for use in the manufacture of 
methamphetamine. See id. 
Sergeant Jensen advised defendant that he was stopping him for a revoked 
registration violation. R543:78. Noting a gun in the pocket of the driver's seat, Sergeant 
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Jensen had defendant "come away from that" by exiting the vehicle. R543:79. About 
that time, Detective Funk arrived and began conversing with defendant. R543:66, 79. 
Sergeant Jensen "proceeded to do an inventory search of the vehicle, incident to the 
revoked registration, which [he was] required to impound" on the revoked registration 
violation. R543:79. During that search, he located the bottle of iodine. Id. 
Meanwhile, Detective Funk learned from defendant that he worked for a trucking 
company and claimed to be a farrier. R543:67. Detective Funk asked defendant "if he 
was shoeing any horses right now," and defendant said that he was not. Id. Detective 
Funk asked defendant "if this was a slow time of the year," and defendant said that it 
was. Id. At that point, Sergeant Jensen came back with the bottle of iodine. Id. 
Detective Funk then told defendant that he had received information that defendant was 
obtaining iodine for use in methamphetamine manufacture. Id. When defendant did not 
respond to that statement, Detective Funk arrested him. Id. 
Defendant now claims that his arrest was illegal. It was not. Detective Funk had 
reasonable cause to believe, based on the large quantity of crystal iodine in the bottle and 
on the information the officers possessed regarding defendant's numerous purchases of 
similar large quantities during the two years preceding this incident, that defendant 
possessed the crystal iodine with the intent that it be used in the manufacture of 
methamphetamine. Thus, he had probable cause to believe that defendant had committed 
and was committing a crime. 
Moreover, Detective Funk and Sergeant Jensen also had probable cause to believe 
that defendant had driven a vehicle with a revoked registration. Driving a vehicle that is 
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not properly registered is a class C misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 41-1 a-1303. An 
officer may make a warrantless arrest "'for any public offense committed or attempted in 
the presence of the officer.55' State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, % 29, 57 P.3d 1052 (quoting 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2(1)). "The term 'public offense5 under section 77-7-2(1) 
generally includes misdemeanors.55 Id. Accordingly, an officer who has probable cause 
to believe that an individual is driving an unregistered vehicle in his presence may arrest 
that individual. 
The record evidence supports a determination that the police officers had probable 
cause to arrest defendant both for violating the Controlled Substance Precursor Act and 
for driving an unregistered vehicle. Thus, it would have been futile for counsel to argue 
in a motion to suppress that defendant's confession should have been excluded because 
he was unlawfully arrested. Counsel is not ineffective for not making or pursuing futile 
claims.8 See Whittle, 1999 UT 96, \ 34. 
B. Defendant, who received his Miranda warnings before agreeing to speak with 
police officers, did not later invoke the right to counsel. 
Defendant's claim that he invoked his right to counsel during the police 
interrogation is frivolous. Defendant originally raised this claim in his motion for a new 
trial, arguing then, as he does now, that pretrial counsel should have moved to suppress 
Even had defendant's arrest been unlawful, that, of itself, would not have made 
his confession excludable. The confession would be excludable only if it was "obtained 
by police exploitation of a prior illegality.55 State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, \ 62, 63 P.3d 
650 (addressing consent to search). One factor to be considered is intervening 
circumstances between the illegality and the confession. "Intervening circumstances may 
include such events as an officer telling a person he or she has the right to refuse consent 
[to be interrogated] or to consult with an attorney.55 Id. at \ 68. 
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his confession on this basis. R416-17. The trial court denied defendant's motion. 
R522-27. Making a substantially identical claim now, defendant argues that he 
misunderstood his right to counsel, believing that when he asked to speak with the deputy 
county attorney during his interrogation that he was invoking the right to counsel. See 
Br. Aplt. at 24-25. He claims that the officers violated his Sixth Amendment rights by 
"not clarifying that Mr. Langston did not count for purposes of Miranda." Id. at 29. 
Because defendant originally raised this basis for an ineffective assistance claim in 
his motion for a new trial, he can prevail on the claim only if he can show that the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying the motion. Defendant cannot make that showing. 
"[A] defendant's request to speak to a prosecutor does not constitute even an equivocal 
assertion of the right to counsel. Thus police are free to continue to question a suspect 
who has only requested to speak to a prosecuting attorney." State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 
934 (Utah 1998). 
Defendant asked to speak to the prosecutor to determine whether it was in his 
interest to confess and cooperate. See R523-24 (findings); see also R484-97 (transcript 
of interrogation interview). The trial court properly found that defendant did "not 
request[] to talk to counsel," but instead "requested] to talk to Brent Langston, the 
Deputy Emery County Attorney, whom defendant believed would be able to enlighten 
him as to any deals the prosecutor's office might be willing to make." R523. The trial 
court properly concluded that "[b]ecause the defendant waived his right to counsel at the 
outset of the interrogation and did not make a later equivocal request for counsel, Margret 
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Taylor . . . did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by not filing a motion to 
suppress the confession made to the officers." R524. 
In sum, defendant has not established the existence of any basis to support a 
motion to suppress. As a consequence, he has not shown that counsel was deficient for 
not pursuing a motion to suppress. Neither has he shown that he was prejudiced. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this \*\ day of ^Ak*~ / , 2006. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 58. Occupations and Professions 
KM Chapter 37C. Utah Controlled Substance Precursor Act 
-•§ 58~37c-3. Definitions 
In addition to the definitions in Section 58-1-102, as used in this chapter: 
(1) "Board" means the Controlled Substance Precursor Advisory Board created in 
Section 58-37c-4. 






























Piperidine and its salts; 
N-acetylanthranilic acid and its salts; 
Pyrrolidine; 
Phenylacetic acid and its salts; 
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(t) Benzyl cyanide; 
(u) Ergonovine and its salts; 
(v) 3,4-Methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone; 








(ee) Hydriotic acid; 
(ff) gamma butyrolactone (GBL), including butyrolactone, 1,2 butanolide, 2-
oxanolone, tetrahydro-2-furanone, dihydro-2(3H)-furanone, and tetramethylene 
glycol, but not including gamma aminobutric acid (GABA); 
(gg) 1,4 butanediol; 
(hh) any salt, isomer, or salt of an isomer of the chemicals listed in Subsections 
(2)(a) through (gg); 
(ii) Crystal iodine; 
(jj) Iodine at concentrations greater than 1.5% by weight in a solution or matrix; 
(kk) Red phosphorous, except as provided in Section 58-37c-19.7; 
(11) anhydrous ammonia, except as provided in Section 58-37c-19.9; 
(mm) any controlled substance precursor listed under the provisions of the Federal 
Controlled Substances Act [FN1] which is designated by the director under the 
emergency^listing provisions set forth in Section 58-37c-14; and 
(nn) any chemical which is designated by the director under the emergency listing 
provisions set forth in Section 58-37c-14. 
(3) "Deliver," "delivery," "transfer," or "furnish" means the actual, constructive, 
or attempted transfer of a controlled substance precursor. 
(4) "Matrix" means something, as a substance, in which something else originates, 
develops, or is contained. 
(5) "Person" means any individual, group of individuals, proprietorship, 
partnership, joint venture, corporation, or organization of any type or kind. 
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(6) "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist, podiatric physician, veterinarian, 
pharmacist, scientific investigator, pharmacy, hospital, pharmaceutical 
manufacturer, or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted to 
distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to, administer, or use in 
teaching, or chemical analysis a controlled substance in the course of professional 
practice or research in this state. 
(7) (a) "Regulated distributor" means a person within the state who provides, sells, 
furnishes, transfers, or otherwise supplies a listed controlled substance precursor 
chemical in a regulated transaction. 
(b) "Regulated distributor" does not include any person excluded from regulation 
under this chapter. 
(8) (a) "Regulated purchaser" means any person within the state who receives a 
listed controlled substance precursor chemical in a regulated transaction. 
(b) "Regulated purchaser" does not include any person excluded from regulation 
under this chapter. 
(9) "Regulated transaction" means any actual, constructive or attempted: 
(a) transfer, distribution, delivery, or furnishing by a person within the state 
to another person within or outside of the state of a threshold amount of a listed 
precursor chemical; or 
(b) purchase or acquisition by any means by a person within the state from another 
person within or outside the state of a threshold amount of a listed precursor 
chemical. 
(10) "Retail distributor" means a grocery store, general merchandise store, drug 
store, or other entity or person whose activities as a distributor are limited 
almost exclusively to sales for personal use: 
(a) in both number of sales and volume of sales; and 
(b) either directly to walk-in customers or in face-to-face transactions by direct 
sales. 
(11) "Threshold amount of a listed precursor chemical" means any amount of a 
controlled substance precursor or a specified amount of a controlled substance 
precursor in a matrix; however, the division may exempt from the provisions of this 
chapter a specific controlled substance precursor in a specific amount and in 
certain types of transactions which provisions for exemption shall be defined by 
the division by rule adopted pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 4 6a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act. 
(12) "Unlawful conduct" as defined in Section 58-1-501 includes knowingly and 
intentionally: 
(a) engaging in a regulated transaction without first being appropriately licensed 
or exempted from licensure under this chapter; 
(b) acting as a regulated distributor and selling, transferring, or in any other 
way conveying a controlled substance precursor to a person within the state who is 
not appropriately licensed or exempted from licensure as a regulated purchaser, or 
selling, transferring, or otherwise conveying a controlled substance precursor to 
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a person outside of the state and failing to report the transaction as required; 
(c) acting as a regulated purchaser and purchasing or in any other way obtaining a 
controlled substance precursor from a person within the state who is not a 
licensed regulated distributor, or purchasing or otherwise obtaining a controlled 
substance precursor from a person outside of the state and failing to report the 
transaction as required; 
(d) engaging in a regulated transaction and failing to submit reports and keep 
required records of inventories required under the provisions of this chapter or 
rules adopted pursuant to this chapter; 
(e) making any false statement in any application for license, in any record to be 
kept, or on any report submitted as required under this chapter; 
(f) with the intent of causing the evasion of the recordkeeping or reporting 
requirements of this chapter and rules related to this chapter, receiving or 
distributing any listed controlled substance precursor chemical in any manner 
designed so that the making of records or filing of reports required under this 
chapter is not required; 
(g) failing to take immediate steps to comply with licensure, reporting, or 
recordkeeping requirements of this chapter because of lack of knowledge of those 
requirements, upon becoming informed of the requirements; 
(h) presenting false or fraudulent identification where or when receiving or 
purchasing a listed controlled substance precursor chemical; 
(i) creating a chemical mixture for the purpose of evading any licensure, 
reporting or recordkeeping requirement of this chapter or rules related to this 
chapter, or receiving a chemical mixture created for that purpose; 
(j) if the person is at least 18 years of age, employing, hiring, using, 
persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing another person under 18 years of age 
to violate any provision of this chapter, or assisting in avoiding detection or 
apprehension for any violation of this chapter by any federal, state, or local law 
enforcement official; and 
(k) obtaining or attempting to obtain or to possess any controlled substance 
precursor or any combination of controlled substance precursors knowing or having 
a reasonable cause to believe that the controlled substance precursor is intended 
to be used in the unlawful manufacture of any controlled substance. 
(13) "Unprofessional conduct" as defined in Section 58-1-102 and as may be further 
defined by rule includes the following: 
(a) violation of any provision of this chapter, the Controlled Substance Act 
[FN2] of this state or any other state, or the Federal Controlled Substance Act; 
and 
(b) refusing to allow agents or representatives of the division or authorized law 
enforcement personnel to inspect inventories or controlled substance precursors or 
records or reports relating to purchases and sales or distribution of controlled 
substance precursors as such records and reports are required under this chapter. 
Laws 1992, c. 155, § 3; Laws 1993, c. 297, § 183; Laws 1996, c. 232, § 11, 
eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 1998, c. 100, § 1, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2000, c. 271, 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37c-3 
§ 3, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2000, c. 272, § 1, eff. May 1, 2000. 
[FN1] See 21 U.S.C.A. § 801 et seq. 
[FN2] Section 58-37-1 et seq. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Definitions relevant to this chapter, see § 58-37-2. 
Exemption from licensure under Title 58, see § 58-1-307. 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Addendum B 
7th DIST. COURT - CASTLE DALE COURT 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 





Case No: 031700004 FS 
Judge: BRYCE K. BRYNER 
Date: January 7, 2003 
PRESENT 
Clerk: julieqw 
Prosecutor: LANGSTON, W. BRENT 
Defendant 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 29, 1968 
Audio 
Tape Number: 0803-1 Tape Count: 1087 
CHARGES 
1. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
INITIAL APPEARANCE 
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant. 
The Information is read. 
Advised of charges and penalties. 
The defendant is advised of right to counsel. 
The def indicated he would hire his own counsel. 
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Case No: 031700004 
Date: Jan 07, 2 003 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 02/04/2003 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Courtroom A 
EMERY CO. COURT HOUSE 
95 EAST MAIN 
CASTLE DALE, UT 84513 
Before Judge: BRYCE K. BRYNER 
Page 2 (last) 
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7th DIST. COURT - CASTLE DALE COURT 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 





Case No: 031700004 FS 
Judge: BRYCE K. BRYNER 
Date: November 18, 2 004 
PRESENT 
Clerk: julieqw 
Prosecutor: LANGSTON, W. BRENT 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): TAYLOR, MARGRET SIDWELL 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 29, 1968 
Audio 
Tape Number: CD-2 0 Tape Count: 9:47 
CHARGES 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 




















Case No: 031700004 
Date: Nov 18, 2004 
10. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty 
11. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty 
12. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty 
13. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty 
14. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty 
15. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty 
16. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty 
17. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty 
HEARING 
This was the date and hour set for Jury Trial in this matter. 
Counsel contacted the court yesterday afternoon and indicated they 
had reached a plea agreement. 
The Court inquired of def counsel and the def if that was their 
intent. Each of them addressed the Court. 
The Court finds the def is not prepared to enter a plea at this 
time. Ms. Taylor made a Motion to Withdraw from the case. 
The Court finds that there appears to be a conflict between the 
def and his counsel and will allow Ms. Taylor to withdraw from the 
case. 
The Court sets this matter for Jury Trial beginning January 26, 
2005, at 9:00 a.m. and sets it for two days. The def is to appear 
back before this court on December 7, 2004, at 1:30 p.m. together 
with his new counsel. 
JURY TRIAL is scheduled. 
Date: 01/26/2005 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Courtroom A 
EMERY CO. COURT HOUSE 
1850 North 560 West 
CASTLE DALE, UT 84 513 
Before Judge: BRYCE K. BRYNER 
Page 2 2 
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Date: Nov 18, 2 004 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 01/27/2005 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Courtroom A 
EMERY CO. COURT HOUSE 
1850 North 560 West 
CASTLE DALE, UT 84513 
Before Judge: BRYCE K. BRYNER 
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. 
Date: 12/07/2004 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Courtroom A 
EMERY CO. COURT HOUSE 
1850 North 560 West 
CASTLE DALE, UT 84513 
Before Judge: BRYCE K. BRYNER 
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7th DIST. COURT - CASTLE DALE COURT 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 




Case No: 031700004 FS 
Judge: BRYCE K. BRYNER 
Date: December 7, 2004 
PRESENT 
Clerk: julieqw 
Prosecutor: LANGSTON, W. BRENT 
Defendant 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 29, 1968 
Audio 
Tape Number: CD-21 Tape Count: 2:04 
CHARGES 
10 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 






Dec 07, 2004 
11. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR 
Plea: Not Guilty 
12. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR 
Plea: Not Guilty 
13. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR 
Plea: Not Guilty 
14. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR 
Plea: Not Guilty 
15. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR 
Plea: Not Guilty 
16. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR 
Plea: Not Guilty 
17. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR 
Plea: Not Guilty 
HEARING 
ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
The Court finds that the def has employed Attorney, Bruce Oliver. 
The Court confirms the trial set for January 2 6 and 27, 2 005, and 
further sets a Pre-Trial on Jan. 4, 2005, at 9:00 a.m. 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 01/04/2005 
Time: 09:45 a.m. 
Location: Courtroom A 
EMERY CO. COURT HOUSE 
1850 North 560 West 
CASTLE DALE, UT 84 513 
Before Judge: BRYCE K. BRYNER 
Page 2 (last) 2 
7th DIST. COURT - CASTLE DALE COURT 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
JEFFERY (NMI) HOUSTON, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
LAW AND MOTION 
Case No: 031700004 FS 
Judge: BRUCE K. HALLIDAY 
Date: December 21, 2004 
PRESENT 
Clerk: julieqw 
Prosecutor: BLACKWELL, DAVID A 
Defendant not present 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 29, 1968 
Audio 
Tape Number: CD-21 Tape Count: 9:17 
CHARGES 
1. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
2. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT • 
Plea: Not Guilty 
3. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
4. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
5. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
6. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
7. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
8. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
9. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
10. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
- 2nd Degree Felony 
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OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Guilty 
OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Guilty 
OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Guilty 
OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Guilty 
OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Guilty 
OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Guilty 
















This matter was placed on the calendar because of def counsel's 
motion to withdraw, however, the def was unable to be found to 
receive service of the notice of today's hearing. 
The Court confirmed the January 4, 2005, pre-trial. 
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7th DIST. COURT - CASTLE DALE COURT 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Case No: 031700004 FS 
Judge: BRYCE K. BRYNER 
Date: January 4, 2 0 05 
PRESENT 
Clerk: wendid 
Prosecutor: LANGSTON, WILLIAM B 
Defendant 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 29, 1968 
Audio 
Tape Number: CD-21 Tape Count: 9:48 50 
CHARGES 
10 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
- 2nd Degree Felony 
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OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Guilty 
OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Guilty 
OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Guilty 
OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Guilty 
OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Guilty 
OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Guilty 
















The defendant advised the Court that his attorney has withdrawn. 
The Court questioned the defendant and based upon his answers and 
the Motion that his attorney filed, found that his attorney had 
withdrawn because the defendant failed to keep in touch 
with him. 
The defendant is employed full time and does not qualify for a 
public defender. 
The Court denied the defendant's request for a continuance and 
confirms the trial date of January 26 and 27, 2005 at 9:00 a.m. 
The Court urged the defendant to do whatever it takes to secure 
counsel for himself. 
Dated this day of 20 
BRYCE K. BRYNER 
District Court Judge 
Page 2 (last) 
7th DIST. COURT - CASTLE DALE COURT 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFERY (NMI) HOUSTON, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
REPORT ON ATTORNEY STATUS 
Case No: 031700004 FS 
Judge: BRYCE K. BRYNER 
Date: January 19, 2 005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: julieqw 
Prosecutor: LANGSTON, WILLIAM B 
Defendant 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 29, 1968 
Audio 
Tape Number: CD-22 Tape Count: 9:16 
CHARGES 
10 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
- 2nd Degree Felony 
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OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Guilty 
OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Guilty 
OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Guilty 
OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Guilty 
OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Guilty 
OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Guilty 
















The def informed the Court that he has not hired counsel. The def 
was informed that the Jury Trial will go forward as set to begin on 
January 26 & 27, 2005. The Court finds that the def has had ample 
time to hire counsel. 
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7th DIST. COURT - CASTLE DALE COURT 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Case No: 031700004 FS 
Judge: BRYCE K. BRYNER 
Date: January 26, 2 005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: juliegw 
Prosecutor: LANGSTON, WILLIAM B 
Defendant 
Defendant pro se 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 29, 1968 
Audio 
Tape Number: CD-23 Tape Count: 9:27 
CHARGES 
1. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
2. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
3. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
4. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
5. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
6. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
7. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
8. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
9. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
10. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
2nd Degree Felony 
- 2nd Degree Felony 
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Case No: 031700004 
Date: Jan 26, 2005 
Plea: Not Guilty 
11. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
12. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
13. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
TRIAL 
TAPE: CD-23 COUNT: 9:27 
Court opened without the jury present. 
COUNT: 9:28 
The Court addressed the def ' s Affidavit of Indigency which was 
faxed to the Court on 1-24-05 at 11:30 p.m. The Court finds that 
the application is incomplete and untimely and the Court will not 
consider the Affidavit. 
COUNT: 9:31 
The Court then reviewed with those present the timeline of the 
case since it was filed with the Court. 
COUNT: 9:37 
The Court finds the def had ample time to hire private counsel or 
apply for court-appointed counsel, but has failed to do so. The 
Court finds it has no other option at this time than to go forward 
with the trial today. 
COUNT: 9:38 
The Court inquired of the State the difference between the Amended 
Information and the Second Amended Information. The State 
addressed the Court's question. The def had no objection to the 
Second Amended Information. 
COUNT: 9:40 
The Court orders the Second Amended Information filed. The Court 
explained the jury selection process to the def and his right to 
testify and present evidence and witnesses. 
COUNT: 9:45 
The def requested a continuance to allow him time to get his 
witnesses. The State objected. The Court denied the motion for 
continuance. 
COUNT: 9:49 
The jury was brought into the Courtroom. The Court welcomed the 
jurors and briefly explained the jury selection process. The 
jurors were given the Oath on Voir Dire. 
COUNT: 9:54 
- 2nd Degree Felony 
- 2nd Degree Felony 
- 2nd Degree Felony 
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Case No: 031700004 
Date: Jan 26, 2005 
The Clerk read the names of 16 jurors randomly drawn by the 
computer. The Court explained the nature of the charges to the 
prospective jurors. The Court then questioned the jurors regarding 
their competency to serve as trial jurors. 
The following jurors were excused for cause: Howard Dale 
VanWagoner, Kent Stilson, Morris Blackburn, Tyler Wilstead, Larene 
Ivie, Youlonda James, Casey Vuksinick, Eric Pedersen, Wendi 
Downard. 
The clerk called additional names to replace those excused to 
total 16 prospective jurors. The State and Mr. Houston then 
exercised their pre-emptory challenges. 
COUNT: 11:58 
The Clerk read the names of the 8 jurors selected to try the case 
as follows: Anna Emery, Jack Fielder, Wayne Roberts, Melanie 
Thompson, Daisy Van Wagoner, Denise Childs, Annette Reid, Clifton 
Carter. The jurors were given the Oath to Try to Case. 
The Court excused the jurors not selected. 
COUNT: 12:00 
The Court admonished the jury as to proper conduct and excused the 
jury. 
COUNT: 12:02 
The Court was in session outside the jury. On request of the 
State, the Court inquired of the def his physical status because 
the State had been made aware that the def worked graveyard shift 
last night. 
COUNT: 12:03 
The def requested a continuance until tomorrow. The State 
objected. The Court denied the motion. 
COUNT: 12:07 
The Court recessed for lunch. 
COUNT: 1:35 
Court reconvened with all parties and the jury present. 
COUNT: 1:36 
The Clerk read the information and the jurors were informed that 
the def had entered pleas of Not Guilty to all charges. 
COUNT: 1:46 
The State presented opening statements. 
COUNT: 1:56 
Mr. Houston presented opening statements. 
COUNT: 1:59 
State's witness, Jennifer McNair, State Crime Lab Ciminalist, was 
sworn and testifed. 
COUNT: 2:06 
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Date: Jan 26, 2005 
State's witness, Colleen Davis, Emery Animal Health, was sworn and 
testified. 
COUNT: 2:14 
State's exhibit #1, was offered. Mr. Houston objected. The State 
layed more foundation. 
COUNT: 2:16 
The State re-offered ex #1. The Court overruled the def's 
objection and received ex #1. 
COUNT: 2:21 
State's witness, Deputy Greg Funk, Emery County Sheriff's office, 
was sworn and testified. 
COUNT: 2:30 
State's exhibit #2, was offered and received. 
COUNT: 2:40 
State's witness, Sgt. Gayle Jensen, was sworn and testified. 
COUNT: 2:46 
State's witness Leonard (Butch) Rogers, Farrier, was sworn and 
testified. 
COUNT: 2:58 
State's witness, Sgt. Tom Harrison, Emery Co. Sheriff's Office, 
was sworn and testified. 
COUNT: 3:15 
The Court admonished the jury as to proper conduct and excused 
them from the courtroom. The Court took its afternoon break. 
COUNT: 3:33 
Court reconvened with all parties and the jury present. 
COUNT: 3:34 
State's witness, Tom Harrison, resumed testimony. 
COUNT: 3:46 
State's witness, Glen Jensen, Emery Animal Health, was sworn and 
testified. 
COUNT: 4:02 
The State requested that Exhibit #1 be published to the Jury. The 
Court granted the request. 
COUNT: 4:09 
Court admomished the jury and excused them from the courtroom. 
Court then recessed for the day. 
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7th DIST. COURT - CASTLE DALE COURT 
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Case No: 031700004 FS 
Judge: BRYCE K. BRYNER 
Date: January 27, 2 0 05 
PRESENT 
Clerk: julieqw 
Prosecutor: LANGSTON, WILLIAM B 
Defendant 
Defendant pro se 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 29, 
Tape Number: CD-23 
1968 
Tape Count: 9:07 
CHARGES 
10 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT • 
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT • 
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT • 
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT • 
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT -
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT • 
Plea: Not Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT • 
Plea: Not Guilty 
. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
• 2nd Degree Felony 
• 2nd Degree Felony 
• 2nd Degree Felony 
• 2nd Degree Felony 
• 2nd Degree Felony 
• 2nd Degree Felony 
• 2nd Degree Felony 
• 2nd Degree Felony 
• 2nd Degree Felony 
- 2nd Degree Felony 
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Case No: 031700004 
Date: Jan 27, 2005 
11. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
12. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
13. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT 
Plea: Not Guilty 
TRIAL 
COUNT: 9:07 
Court reconvened with all parties present outside the jury. 
COUNT: 9:08 
The Court explained the def' s right to testify and present 
evidence. The Court recessed for 15 minutes to allow the def time 
to prepare his questions. 
COUNT: 9:35 
Court reconvened with all parties and jury present. 
COUNT: 9:36 
Def, Jeffery Houston, was sworn and testified. 
COUNT: 9:39 
Def ex #3, offered and received. 
COUNT: 10:49 
The jury was admonished and excused to allow the parties to 
discuss matters of law. 
COUNT: 10:51 
The Court was in session outside the jury. The State requested 
that the jury be allowed to listed to the taped interview with the 
def and be given a copy of the transcript prepared by Teresa 
Manzanares to assist in following along with the tape. 
COUNT: 10:53 
Mr. Houston objected. The parties argued the matter. The Court 





Court reconvened with all parties and jury present. 
Def, Jeffery Houston, resumed testimony. 
COUNT: 11:17 
The defense rested its case. 
State's witness, Sgt. Tom Harrison, was recalled. 
'COUNT: 11:25 
State's witness, Sheriff Lamar Guymon, was sworn and testified. 
- 2nd Degree Felony 
- 2nd Degree Felony 
- 2nd Degree Felony 
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Date: Jan 27, 2005 
COUNT: 11:28 
The jury was admonished and excused from the courtroom 
COUNT: 11:29 
The Court was in session outside the jury. 
State!s witness, Teresa Manzanares, was sworn and testified. 
COUNT: 11:38 





The Court reconvened outside the jury. The Court grants the 
State's request to allow the jurors to view the transcript of the 
interview while listening to the tape. The Court finds the person 
who prepared the transcript is qualified although she is 
not currently a certified court transcriber. 
COUNT: 12:00 
The Court recessed for lunch. 
COUNT: 1:04 
Court reconvened with all parties and the jury present. 
COUNT: 1:05 
State's witness, Colleen Davis, was recalled. 
COUNT: 1:14 
State's witness, Sgt. Tom Harrison, was recalled. 
COUNT: 1:16 
The state offered exhibit #4. Mr. Houston voir dired the witness. 
COUNT: 1:20 
The jury was admonished and excused from the courtroom to discuss 
matters of law. 
COUNT: 1:21 
The Court was in session outside the jury. 
Mr. Houston objected to exhibit #4. The parties argued the 
admission of exhibit #4. 
COUNT: 1:26 
Brent Langston, Emery County Attorney, was sworn and testified. 
COUNT: 1:34 
Mr. Houston argued the admission of exhibit #4. 
COUNT: 1:38 
State's witness, Greg Funk, was recalled. 
COUNT: 1:40 
The State re-offered exhibit #4. Mr. Houston objected. 
COUNT: 1:41 
In this matter, the Court finds it is the burden of the def to 
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show that the tape was altered and he has failed to do that. The 
objection is overruled. Exhibit #4 is received. 
COUNT: 1:42 
The jury was returned to the courtroom. 
COUNT: 1:43 
State's witness, Dr. Glen Jensen, was recalled. 
COUNT: 1:54 
The State requested the jury be allowed to listed to exhibit #4 
and to distribute the transcript to the jury. 
The Court granted the motion. 
COUNT: 1:56 
The Court instructed the jury that the transcript is for the sole 
purpose of assisting them in listening to the tape. 
COUNT: 1:59 
The tape (exhibit #4) was then played for the jury. 
COUNT: 2:50 
The Court admonished the jury and excused them from the courtroom. 
The Court then took a brief recess. 
COUNT: 3:06 
Court reconvened with all parties and the jury present. Exhibit 
#4, audio tape, continued to play for the jury. 
COUNT: 3:46 
Exhibit #4, audio tape, was concluded. 
The State rested its case. 
The def was informed of his right to present sur-rebuttal 
testimony. 
COUNT: 3:47 
The defendant was recalled. 
COUNT: 3:58 
The defendant rested his case. 
The Court finds both sides have concluded their case and rested. 
COUNT: 3:59 
The jury was admonished and excused from the courtroom. 
COUNT: 4:00 
The Court was in session outside the jury. The State and 
defendant were given copies of the proposed jury instructions and 
verdict. The Court requested the parties to review those tonight 
and it will take exceptions to them tomorrow morning. 
COUNT: 4:01 
Court adjourned for the day, to be continued at 8:45 tomorrow 
morning. 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
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Case No: 031700004 FS 
Judge: BRYCE K. BRYNER 
Date: January 28, 2 005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: julieqw 
Prosecutor: LANGSTON, WILLIAM B 
Defendant 
Defendant pro se 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 29, 1968 
Audio 
Tape Number: CD-23 Tape Count: 8:52 
CHARGES 
10 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty 
VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty 
. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
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Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty 
11. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty 
12. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty 
13. VIOLATION OF C/S PRECURSOR ACT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/28/2005 Guilty 
TRIAL 
COUNT: 8:52 
The reconvened with all parties present outside the jury. 
COUNT: 8:54 
The Court inquired if counsel and the def have any exceptions or 
objections to the proposed jury instructions or the verdict form. 
COUNT: 8:55 
The State informed the Court that they have no exceptions or 
objections to the jury instructions nor the verdict form. 
The def informed the Court that he has no exceptions or objections 
to the jury instructions nor the verdict form. 
COUNT: 8:57 





Court reconvened with all parties and the jury present. 
COUNT: 9:09 
The Court read the jury instructions to the jury. 
COUNT: 9:33 
The State presented closing arguments. 
COUNT: 10:25 
The Court instructed the jury as to selecting a foreperson. 
The bailiff was sworn and the jury was excused from the courtroom 
to begin deliberations. 
COUNT: 11:22 
The Court was informed that the jury had reached a verdict. Court 
reconvened with all parties present. The jury was returned to the 
courtroom. All jurors were present. The foreperson informed the 
Court that the jury had reached a verdict. 
The verdict was handed to the Judge. 
COUNT: 11:25 
The Clerk read the verdict. The def was found GUILTY as to all 13 
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counts in the information. 
COUNT: 11:26 
The jury was poled. The Court found the verdict to be unanimous. 
The Court ordered the verdict entered on the record. 
COUNT: 11:27 
The jury was thanked for their service and excused. 
COUNT: 11:29 
The Court was in session outside the jury. The Court orders the 
defendant to be taken into custody at this time. 
The Court could not appoint counsel on the first day of trial 
because it found the application was not timely filed. At this 
time, because the def is incarcerated, the Court finds he qualifie 
for the public defender and appoints David Allred for sentenc 
COUNT: 11:31 
The Court denied the def!s request to be released on his own 
recognize. 
The def is ordered to appear with counsel on February 1, 2005, at 
9:00 a.m. at which time this matter will be referred to State 
Corrections for a presentence report and a sentencing date set. 
The def was remanded to the custody of the Emery County Sheriff. 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints DAVID M ALLRED to 
represent the defendant. 
Appointed Counsel: 
Name: DAVID M ALLRED 
Address: POB 5 75 
City: CASTLE DALE UT 84537 
Phone: (435)381-5326 
Affidavit of indigency has been completed by the defendant 
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SET SENTENCING DATE is scheduled. 
Date: 02/01/2005 
Time: 09:OO a.m. 
Location: Courtroom A 
EMERY CO. COURT HOUSE 
1850 North 560 West 
CASTLE DALE, UT 84513 
Before Judge: BRYCE K. BRYNER 
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D, Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendant 
180 South 300 "West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
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MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 031700004 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
Comes now the defendant, Jeffery Houston, by and through counsel, D. Bruce 
Oliver, and hereby moves this Honorable Court for a new trial based upon effectiveness 
assistance of counsel causing an unfair trial and violation'of due process. In the alternative, 
Defendant seeks reconsideration and an order vacating the March 14, 2005 sentence based 
upon newly discovered evidence and prosecutorial immunity for re-sentencing purposes. 
Said motion is submitted pursuant to Rule 25, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Said motion is further submitted pursuant to Kule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedures. Finally, said motion is supported by the accompanying memorandum or points 
and authorities, which is incorporated herein by this reference. 
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Dated this day of March, 2005. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on this 23rd day of March, 2005,1 
served a copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL upon the counsel for the 
Defendant in this matter, and other presumed interested parties by mailing it to counsel by first 
class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following addresses: David A. Blackwell, W. 
Brent Langston, P.O. Box 249, Castle, Utah 84513. 
J^^v^cr 
D.Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
FILED 
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MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 031700004 
Judge Bryce K. Bryncr 
Comes now the defendant, Jeffery Houston, by and through counsel, D. Bruce 
Oliver, and hereby submits this memoranda of points and authorities in support of his Uonon 
For New Trial 
INTRODUCTION. 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads; 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in 
the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse 
effect upon the rights of a party* 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The motion shall 
be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in support of the motion. If 
additional time is required to procure affidavits or evidence the court may postpone the 
hearing on the motion for such time as it deems reasonable. 
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(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of sentence, or 
within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no trial had been 
held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either in evidence or in argument. 
Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads in pertinent part; 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence* or a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner, at any time, 
STATEMENTS OF RELEVANT FACTS. 
1. On December 30, 2002, Defendant was arrested for possessing a pound of 
crystal iodine* 
2. A jury trial was conducted in this matter on January 26-28, 2005 before the 
Honorable Bryce K. Brynen 
3. The prior Thursday, January 19, 2005, the Court conducted a status conference 
with defendant present* During that conference, the court instructed Mr. Houston to fill out an 
affidavit of indigency for appointment of counsel consideration. The court's instruction was 
to file it iwmedfattty* 
4. By Monday, January 24, 2005, at 11:30 p.m., Defendant faxed in his 
application. However> the judge was not presented the application until Tuesday afternoon-the 
day before trial. 
5. The following day, the Court entered findings which included the long sorted 
history of the case, and the court conclusion was two-fold: (1) the application was untimely* 
and (2) the defendant had been provided two months to obtain counsel, 
6. The history of tbe case included: 
i 
A. This action was filed by an original information charging document on 
January 6, 2003, The information was one count of possession of a precursor, iodine crystals. 
B. On February 3, 2003, Margret Taylor appeared on the defendant's 
behalf, and a prelim was scheduled for April 4, 2003. 
C. That scheduled prelim was not held and subsequently postponed. 
D» On or about December 2, 2003, through counsel, the prelim was waived. 
E. On or about April 4, 2004, a suppression hearing was scheduled. 
F. That hearing was also continued. 
D. A trial was scheduled to convene on November 17, 2004; however, one 
day before trial it was canceled because an alleged plea agreement was reached. 
E- That agreement never resulted and a dispute arose between Taylor and 
her client. As a result Taylor moved for her withdrawal as counsel. The court permitted the 
withdrawal* 
F. Trial was scheduled for trial to convene on January 26, 2005. The 
defendant was informed he had to obtain new counsel and appear before the court on 
December 7, 2004 at a hearing* 
O. At that December 7, 2004 hearing, the defendant appeared before the 
Honorable Bryce K. Bryner and informed the court that he had retained D. Bruce Oliver as his 
attorney. This representation was supported by the written appearance of counsel mailed to the 
court by Mr. Oliver. 
H. However, on or about December 16, 2004, Mr Oliver motioned for the 
withdrawal as counsel due to loss of contact with the defendant. The court permitted that 
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withdrawal 
I. On January 13, 2005, the court ordered Mr. Houston to appear to 
discuss options, 
7. A first amended information was filed on or about May 5, 2003 alleging 16 
additional counts for a total of 17 counts covering alleged criminal conduct from June 29, 1999 
to December 30, 2002* 
8. On the first day of trial, Thursday, January 26, 2005, the court conducted a jury 
trial But first before trial, the court declined to appoint counsel for Mr. Houston, requiring 
him to proceed pro se, or without counsel 
9. Following that decision, the State filed a second amended information charging 
document reducing the number of counts to 13. 
10. The counts were each possession of a controlled substance precursor (crystal 
iodine) with knowledge that it would be intended to be used in the manufacturer of 
methamphetamine. All counts were second decree felonies. 
11. The basis for these charges is Houston's alleged purchase history printout from 
the Emery Animal Health coupled with alleged admissions taken from Houston during his 
three hour interrogation by Detective Gregory Funk, Sgt. Gayle Jensen, Sgt. Tom Harrison, 
and Deputy Emery County Attorney W. Brent Langston. 
12. During that interrogation, the defendant maintained for an hour the crystal 
iodine was lawfully purchased at the animal clinic, that he was a farrier, and he used the 
crystal iodine as a farrier while shoeing horses* 
13. Crystal iodine is used as an antiseptic. It is used by farrier while shoeing to 
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combat bacteria and ftmgal conditions, such as thrush. 
14. During the interrogation, the defendant indicated that in the puai he ha* had 
crystal iodine stolen from him, he has spilled iodine, and he has used crystal iodine as a 
preventative. 
15. It is undisputed that Mr. Houston is a licensed farrier, receiving his education in 
Oklahoma at a farrier school in 1995. 
16. The December 30, 2002 interrogation was transcribed. The three hour event 
totals 61 pages* A copy is attached; however, the defendants disputes its accuracy. 
17. On page one, the defendant is advised of his Miranda rights. 
18. On page 39, the defendant makes an equivocal request for counsel, stating, 
*- With - Why I wanted him here is - is that I kind of - I kind of need to know my position -
where I sit before I incriminate myself any further.n 
19. That equivocal request never was responded to with termination after 
clarification first. Instead, the investigators and Langston all encouraged Houston to cooperate 
offering incentives. On page 39, Mr, Langston said, "You make them happy; you make me 
happy . . . But Til be honest with you. You're facing serious charges . . A second degree 
felony. Okay? - . . Now, I'm not saying - I don't know what will happen What happens to 
a large extent depends on you. Yon can tell me to go (inaudible), and that's fine, or we can 
work together.n 
20. At trial, Sgt Harrison testified that Mr. Houston was asked to come a 100% 
clean. On page 40, Houston states, "Yea> I'm more than interested in - in - Okay, Let's 
put it this way: Til come a hundred percent clean 
s 
21. On page 42, Mr. Langston responded, *Let me tell you this; I've been a 
prosecutor for sixteen years, I've been pretty much . . . (inaudible). I have a reputation of 
being fair. If you want to know the specifics of what I can do, I don't know, because I don't 
know what you have to offer, so I can't make you a promise - you know, promise you the 
minimum without knowing what is there. What I can promise you is that I will be fair with 
you. And, uh, you know, the big thing that you need to look at is there is there is a big 
distinction between felony and misdemeanor. If I am satisfied that you're coming clean with 
me, we can go the route that's not going to make you a convicted felon for the rest of your 
life. And, uh. that's up to you. Til be fair with you, and,everything at this point is 
negotiable depending upon you. You're the one that this all depends on. 
22. During trial testimony, Sgt Harrison testified that it was investigators desire to 
get a lab, he accepted that Mr. Houston could not give them a lab. See also page 43, At trial, 
Harrison further testified that as an alternative,^ was their desire "to go up the latter." 
23. On pages 47-48, Langston speaks of drug court as a best case scenario and a 1 
to 15 sentence as a worse case scenario, 
24. On page 48, Sgt. Harrison interjects, "Let me go on a limb right here and see if 
this will get the ball rolling here, okay? We can't - We don't know what were going to do 
on the delivery. Let's just talk about you. Let's no talk about delivery or anything else. 
You're charged with a second-degree felony right now, okay? We can recommend third-
degree, probation, no jail time; we can recommend drug court" in exchange for Houston 
coining clean. 
25. On page 49, Mr. Houston again expresses his concern about self-incrimination. 
In response, both Harrison and Langston sweetened the pot. 
26. Harrison stated, "-it's not going to get any worse for you right now with our 
charge of a second-degree felony. It's not going to get any worse than that. That's all 
we've got on you right now. 
27. Mr. Langston added, "Let me say this: I've got enough evidence to convict 
you for a second-degree felony • • • Now, I can also decide not even to file it as a felony if I 
think you're coming clean with me. But if you want to play games, that's fine. You don't 
have to do anything, You have the right to not say a word. (See pages 49-50). 
28. On page 50, Houston agreed to cooperate. 
29. After an expression of concern for his family's safety, Mr. Langston reassured 
Houston, "I'm not going to lie to you** 
30. Following these discussions, Mr. Houston breaks down and confesses his 
alleged crime. Moreover, the defendant discussed his role as the purchase man and that he 
would deliver the crystal iodine to John Paul Fazio. 
31. Subsequently, John Paul Pazzio, was picked up and arrested for Driving with 
Measurable Controlled Substance, Possession of a Controlled Substance, and Possession of 
Clandestine Lab Equipment in Carbon County. 
32. Mr. Fazzio was subsequently charged with said offenses in the Seventh District 
Court in Price, Utah under case no, 031403751 and he was convicted and placed on probation. 
ARGUMENT. 
POINT L DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS - EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
In this matter, the defendant asserts that he was denied effective assistance of 
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counsel This ineffective is alleged to have resulted in an unfair jury trial. Had he received 
effective assistance of counsel, (1) Defendant would have had his equivocal request for counsel 
and to remain silem during interrogation suppressed as evidence during the trial; (2) Defendant 
would have had the charge limited to one saumd degree felony, at worse, at the time of trial or 
plead guilty to misdemeanor charges, at best. In the alternative, at trial, the defendant would 
have the benefit of reduced offenses or lesser included offenses presented to the jury at the 
time of trial. 
As case law in support of his effective assistance of counsel claim, Defendant 
directs this Court's attention to State v. Maestas . 984 P,2d 376 (Utah 1999). In this case, the 
Maestas was granted a new trial on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for the simple 
fact that counsel did not ensure a Long instruction was included in that matter, because a 
witness's memory is fallible. In this matter, defense counsel is not certain whether a Long 
instruction was included at the time of trial. The only instructions he has in the file is the 
elements and the "controlled substance precursor" instruction. 
Notwithstanding, more prejudicial error occurred in this matter than what 
occurred in Maestas. In this matter, as demonstrated in the interrogation transcript, Mr. 
Houston was clearly enticed into alleged confessed criminal conduct. That confession was 
relied on heavily at the time of trial. All three investigators, Harrison, Jensen, and Funk all 
referred to the confession that "crystal iodine was being traded for cash or meth" to John Paul 
Fazzio, That confession was even referenced in the opening remarks by the prosecutor, Brent 
Langston who assisted investigators in obtaining the alleged confession upon his promises for 
Mr> Houston coming clean. In this matter the defendant came clean, even after to assertions of 
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his rights against self-incriminitkm and for counsel 
Had counsel been effective, this alleged confession would have been suppressed 
by way of pre-trial motion and hearing. Had counsel bee effective, other errors would not 
have occurred. For instance, Defendant's prelim was waived, Had the prelim not been 
waived~had it conducted, the court would have concluded under the doctrine of Ejusdem 
Generis that and other statutory construction schemes, that as a licensed farrier defendant did 
not commit a violation of Section 58-37c-ll, but rather of Section 58-37c-19. Finally, had 
defendant been afforded effective assistance of counsel, defendant could have compelled the 
State to honor it grant of prosecutorial immunity, which is clearly outlined above. 
See the following arguments for specifics. 
POINT IL DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS - EQUIVOCAL REQUEST FOR COUNSEL 
AND TO REMAIN SILENT. 
In this matter, the defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel against 
Margret Taylor, in part, for her failure to obtain an order of suppression for the equivocal 
request for counsel and to remain silent. See transcript pages 39 and 49. In support of these 
claims, Defendant draws this Court's attention to State y. Sampson . 808 P,2d 1100 (Utah Ct, 
App, 1990), In Sampspfl. the defendant's conviction was reversed and remanded for a new 
trial based upon the fact the jury was permitted to hear the defendant's confession after stating 
"Wellt ahf should I have a lawyer, I mean, well, Fm really not worried about anything, it is just 
that.,." Appellate Judge Onne concluded that it was an equivocal request for counsel and 
needed to be clarified before the interrogation could proceed. The same situation exists here. 
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POINT IIL DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS - DENIED PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY. 
In addition, if effective assistance of counsel was provided Mr. Houston would 
have and could have compelled the prosecutorial immunity he was offered. The agreement to 
treat Mr. Houston fairly was "promised.* During the negotiation, Mr. Houston undeniably 
was informed that if he came clean with the three investigators and Mr. Langston that he could 
be charged with a misdemeanor instead of a felony, or be given drug court, or probation and 
no jail time. These were all enticements made to Defendant in a quid pro quo fashion in 
exchange for information which would letizo a clandestine lab. Defendant never told the 
investigators to walk. Instead, the state was told that Houston would purchase the crystal 
iodine and sell it or trade it to John Paul Fazzio* That fact was admitted by Sgt. Harrison at 
the time of trial Not until after trial was it discovered that in deed, shortly after Houston's 
arrest, Mr. Fazzio was charged for possession of Clandestine Lab Equipment. See Seventh 
District Court case no. 031403751, That stop and arrest is likely the direct result of the 
discussions made between Mr. Houston and the investigators and Mr. Langston. With this 
undisputed fact, it is clear the an offer was made, accepted and defendant was entitled to the 
quid pro quo benefit of his information. Clearly, defendant is entitled to prosecutorial 
immunity for other alleged crimes and or less than second-degree felony charges in exchange 
for his helpful information which substantial l^d to the conviction of John Paul Fazzio and the 
decommission of a clandestine meth lab* 
In support of this argument, the defendant draws this Court's attention to State,, 
v. Ward. 571 P,2d 1343 (Utah 1977). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court explained; 
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The grant of immunity is supposed to be for a quid pro quo in the form of information 
from the grantee, who is or maybe involved in crime. That is, it is in essence a contract. 
It is fundamental that when any agretfcnent is entered into it should reflect a meeting of 
the minds of the parties who enter into it; and this in turn includes knowledge of the 
foundational facts out of which the agreement arises and comes into being. 
IdL, at 1346. In this matter. Defendant is the grantee. In light of the clear events recorded in the 
State's December 30,2002 transcript of Mr. Houston's interrogation. Quid pro quo occurred in 
the form of information (Mr. Houston's coming clean) in exchange for a lesser penalty, In this 
situation, Mr. Houston was offered many enticements: (1) misdemeanor in stead of a second-
decree felony charge, (2) probation, and (3) drug court. None of this occurred, even in the 
context of Mr. Langston's ^promise" to be fair with him. Well, Mr. Houston has not been treated 
fairly even though he came clean that he would trade crystal iodine for cash or meth. His 
confession was that of a violation of Section 58-37C-I9, The sell or distribution of crystal iodine 
in amounts larger than two ounces by a licer^rd person to an unlicensed person is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor That offense is not a felony. 
POINT IV. DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS - UNFAIR TRIAL. 
In this matter, the Defendant asserts he was prejudiced at the time of trial by 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Moreover, he asserts additional prejudicial error that he 
should have been advised of if he was forced to act as his own attorney at the time of triaL In 
this matter, without conceding the point, this Court made findings and declared that Mr. 
Houston waived his right to counsel before calling a jury. The Supreme Court in State v. 
Harmon. 854 P.2d 1037 (Utah Ct App, 1993) stated that before the court may find a 
fundamental right was waived it must be kyrxwr and convincing evidence. On or about 
l i 
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January 19, 2005, this Court led Mr* Houston to believe that counsel would be appointed for 
him at trial by his submission of an affidavit of indigency immediately. January 19. 2005 was 
a Thursday. Taking two days to complete a financial statement which calls for income 
information and monthly expenses in not a clear violation of the court's instruction. Accuracy 
and completeness under penalty of perjury must be regarded* Ultimately, the affidavit was 
faxed to the Court on Monday, January 24, 2005 at 11:30 p.m. The judge did not receive it 
from his clerk until Tuesday afternoon* In the scope of the case, having two attorneys be 
permitted to withdraw without proper substitution after more thaa two years of case history 
caused Mr. Houston prejudice. 
Notwithstanding, other notable error that without may not have resulted in the 
felony conviction. It appears that the Court tried to treat Mr. Houston fairly by taking judicial 
notice of hearsay testimony and striking it. However, on two of the occasions where 
information was stricken, the jury was not instructed that when information is stricken how the 
jury would treat the stricken information. Moreover, at the time of the hearing on this motion, 
the defense wishes an opportunity to examine the Court file to determine what written jury 
instructions were submitted to the jury during deliberation* Consistent with Maestas, supra., 
Defendant is looking for a Long instruction. Furthermore, it is clear from a review of the trial 
audio recordings that the Court did not invoke the exclusionary rule on Defendant's behalf, 
since Mr, Houston lacked the legal skill, knowledge and experience to make such a request of 
the Court, 
In support in this argument, Defendant refers this Court to paretta v, California. 
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422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct, 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975). In thai matter, the defendant chose to 
represent himself, as opposed to this matter, where he was forced to* The High Court 
reasoned: 
When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, 
many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in 
order to represent himself, the accused must 'knowingly and intelligently1 forgo those 
relinquished benefits. Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U-S„ at 464-465, 58 S. Ct, at 1023. Cf. 
Von Moltkev, Gillies. 332 U.S. 708,723-724, 68 S« Ct. 316, 323, 92 L, Ed. 309 
(plurality opinion of Black, J.). Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and 
experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-
representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his 
choice is made with eyes open/ Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann. 317 U.S,, at 
279,63S.Ct.,at242. 
Id., at 835. Implicit in the Faretta decision is the claim that Faretta, once made aware of what he 
was choosing to do he would be free to represent himself Key in that case is the Adams's quote* 
"he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." In this matter, the defendant 
on the morning of the trial was made aware that he was going forward that day without counsel. 
That he was informed thsLdax h e ^ad waived the right of counsel and was having to represent 
himself. Unfortunately for Mr, Houston, his representation of himself was without the benefit of 
knowing what he was required to do and the decision was not his to make with his eyes open. In 
this matter is was obvious from a review of the trial recordings, Mr, Houston did not effectively 
know how to cross examine, many of his questions were statements some rather damning 
statements, that he did not know what hearsay was, that he was not aware of the exclusionary 
rule and that lesser included offenses and other defenses were available to him at the trial. In 
addition, Jennifer McNair's testimony was not founded on her personal knowledge. Admittedly, 
she was not the testing chemist, she only reviewed the work of a colleague. Clearly from the 
13 
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testimony adduced inadequate foundation was lain by Ms. McNair, Also, it was clear from the 
testimony of Colleen Davis was inadmissible. In her testimony, Mrs. Davis testified that she 
only had personal knowledge of selling crystal iodine to the defendant. It was not clarified by 
counsel that she meant that she could only speak of those occasions she was involved, meaning 
others could have sold to other individuals claiming to purchase on Houston's behalf. In 
other words, she was unaware of others using Houston's name. However, it was left 
unresolved suggesting to the jury she had addressed the question directly and affirmatively. 
Also, Sgt. Harrison testified as to hearsay concerning John Paul Fazzio's alleged 
involvement. He testified that he or they "were advised . . . .** It would appear due to the 
Court lack of objection for hearsay on Mr. Houston's behalf, the Court must have assumed 
the advisement came from Mr. Houston. However, from a defense attorney's perspective it is 
clear that he was testifying about another speaking to him. 
The undersigned counsel wishes to point out that he does not fault the court for 
its decision to move this matter along on the trial date in question. If placed in a comparable 
situation, the undersigned might decide the same as this Court did. It is frustrating to the 
court, the parties, and witnesses alike for trial dates to be wasted and matters be dragged 
along. As a defense attorney, the undersigned empathizes with the Court and has shared in 
those frustrations. However, as expressed in Powell vT Alabama. 287 U,S, 45, 53 S, Ct. 55, 
77 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1932), the we all have little choice but to grant a continuance to afford 
counsel In PowelL the High Court reasoned: 
It is true that great and inexcusable delay in the enforcement of our criminal law is one of 
the grave evils of our time. Continuances are frequently granted for unnecessarily long 
14 
periods of time, and delays incident to the disposition of motions for new trial and 
hearings upon appeal have come in many cases to be a distinct reproach to the 
administration of justice. The prompt disposition of criminal cases is to be commended 
and encouraged. But in reaching thauesult a defendant, charged with a serious crime, 
must not be stripped of his right to have sufficient time to advise with counsel and 
prepare his defense. To do that is not to proceed promptly in the claim spirit of regulated 
justice but to go forward with the haste of the mob. 
Defendant expressed concern on two occasions about going forward without 
counsel and expressed his concern for time to prepare. At the commencement of day one, the 
defendant requested for the opportunity to contact witnesses, the Court limited him to contact 
during a recess. The following day, the defendant expressed concern about time to prepare 
questions to ask himself when he was to take the stand. It was just the day before that the 
Court informed him when, or if, he was to take the stand, he would not be permitted to 
ramble, but that he would be required to asked and answer questions only. In response to the 
question, the Court warned Houston that he would have already been prepared. However, it 
was only that morning the Court informed Houston that because the State had rested, Houston 
could then "now" present his case. Afterwards, the Court permitted defendant 15 minutes to 
prepare. After this matter, languished along for two years at the direction of Margret Taylor, 
granting Mr. Houston 15 minutes to manage the entire defense of his case, seems hardly fair. 
CONCLUSION. 
Because of the well-defined pretrial and plain trial errors outlined above, a 
manifest injustice has occurred. Mr. Houston had not waived his right to a fair trial, he had 
not waived his right even to counsel. Even during the interrogation process, Mr. Houston 
is 
expressed an equivocal request for counsel. But for the promises and agreements made been 
the prosecutor, Brent Langston, to come clean and the apparent quid pro quo for information, 
Mr. Langston received the benefits of Mr. Houston's information without any return favors. 
Nonetheless, Mr, Houston only confessed misdemeanor crimes. In short, Mr. Houston should 
not have been convicted of 13 second-degree felonies. But for ineffective assistance of 
counsel, pretrial errors, dishonored agreements, and his own admissions, Defendant .should not 
have been convicted on even one second-degree felony. These convictions resulting from the 
January 26-28, 2005 trial should be vacated; a new trial should be granted; and defendant 
should be granted the opportunity to seek reduced charges. His conduct and admissions were 
misdemeanors only in violation of Section 58-37c-l9. In the alternative, defendant would 
settle for the sentence to be commuted to misdemeanor convictions and or a new trial with the 
lesser included offense instruction of 58-37c-l9. Clearly a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict in the defendant's favor along these above argued points of law, given the facts at 
hand. 
Dated this 23rd day of Ma;h, 2005. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
i d 
C1»»TIFTCATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on this 23rd day of March, 2005,1 
served a copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL upon the counsel for the Defendant in this matter, and other presumed interested 
parties by mailing it to counsel by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the 
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The defendant was convicted by a jury on January 28, 2005, of thirteen counts of 
VIOLATION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE PRECURSOR ACT, each a Second Degree 
Felony. A pre-sentence report was ordered and the sentence was imposed on March 14, 2005. 
The defendant was sentenced to serve 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison on each count and the 
sentences were to be served concurrently. The defendant was also ordered to pay a fine in the 
total amount of $5,000 00 which covered all counts. 
On March 24, 2005, the defendant filed a Motion for New Trial together with a 
Memorandum Supporting Motion for New Trial. The State of Utah filed a Response to 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial and the matter is ripe for decision. 
The defendant's Motion for New Trial claims that he was deprived of due process in three 
areas: (1) denial of effective assistance of counsel; (2) denial of prosecutorial immunity; and (3) 
unfair trial. The court will address each claim individually. 
I. Was the defendant denied effective assistance of counsel? 
A review of the file shows that the defendant was represented by Margret Taylor on a 
private basis from February, 2003, to November 18, 2005, when the defendant dismissed her on 
the day that he was scheduled to enter a plea pursuant to a plea bargain. The defendant then 
employed Mr. Bruce Oliver who represented the defendant for approximately one week in 
December, 2004, and then withdrew with the permission of the court on December 16, 2004, 
because the defendant would not stay in contact with Mr. Oliver. The defendant represented 
himself during the three day jury trial on January 26-28, 2005, after having been admonished by 
the court several times to obtain counsel. Mr. Oliver re-entered the case on March 25, 2005, 
when he filed the Motion for New Trial which is the subject of this ruling. 
A. Failure to suppress statements made during interrogation: The defendant claims his 
first attorney, Margret Taylor, provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to suppress 
the defendant's statements made during his interrogation by law enforcement officers on 
December 30, 2002. The determination of this issue hinges on whether the defendant, while 
under arrest and in custody in the Emery County Sheriffs office on December 30, 2005, 
requested, or knowingly and intelligently waived his right to, counsel. 
A review of the transcript of the interview shows that the defendant, prior to questioning, 
was advised by Officer Harrison of his Miranda rights. The defendant responded by stating that 
he understood his rights and that he did not "have any problem" in talking to the officers. (Tr. at 
p. 1-2). The defendant does not claim that he was not adequately advised of his Miranda rights 
or that he did not waive them, but asserts that later in the interrogation he made an "equivocal 
request" for counsel when he stated, "With - Why I wanted him here is - is that I land of -1 kind 
of need to know my position - where I sit before I incriminate myself any further." Id. at p. 39. 
(Underlining added). The State of Utah claims that the "him" referred to was the prosecutor, not 
a defense attorney, and that the defendant while being interrogated never made any request to talk 
to his own attorney at any time. 
After examining the context in which the defendant claims he made his "equivocal request," 
the court finds that the defendant was not requesting to talk to counsel, but was requesting to talk 
to Brent Langston, the Deputy Emery County Attorney, whom the defendant believed would be 
able to enlighten him as to any deals the prosecutor's office might be willing to make. This 
explains his statement that "I land of need to know my position - where I sit before I incriminate 
myself any further." The dialogue between the defendant and the officers on the three pages 
immediately prior to his statement clearly indicate that the defendant was referring to the deputy 
County Attorney and was not making an "equivocal request" for counsel. At no time during the 
interrogation did the defendant use the word "lawyer" or "attorney" or anything like unto it, and 
the court cannot find that he equivocally invoked his right to counsel by any other language. 
The defendant also claims the benefit of an alleged equivocal request for counsel during the 
interrogation when he said, "One of the things I'm worried about, I guess, is, uh, incriminating 
myself as far as my involvement with it. Uh, I -1 don't understand how..." Tr. at p. 49. The 
context in which the statement was made clearly shows that the defendant was concerned about 
incriminating himself by making a delivery of iodine to a person running a meth lab. See Tran. 
at p. 43 et. seq., and that it was not an equivocal request for counsel. 
Because the defendant waived his right to counsel at the outset of the interrogation and did 
not make a later equivocal request for counsel, Margret Taylor was not dilatory and did not 
provide ineffective assistance of counsel by not filing a motion to suppress the confession made 
to the officers. 
B. Failure to have all but one charge dismissed (Denial of Prosecutorial Immunity): The 
defendant also claims that had he had effective assistance of counsel he "could have compelled 
the prosecutorial immunity he was offered," the charges against him would have been limited to 
one second degree felony at trial, or he would have plead guilty to misdemeanor charges, or, in 
the alternative, he "would have [had] the benefit of reduced offenses or lesser included offenses 
presented to the jury at trial." Def. Motion to Suppress at p. 8 and 10. 
The defendant does not cite to any specific page in the transcript to support his allegations 
and the court is left to speculate where the specific alleged promises were made to the defendant 
by the officers or Mr. Langston during the interrogation. After reviewing the entire transcript the 
court cannot find that any specific, definite, promises were made to the defendant or that a 
meeting of the minds was reached. Moreover, although the defendant claims that he is entitled to 
a quid pro quo, there is no post-interrogation evidence or affidavit furnished by defendant to 
support his claim that any information he gave the officers or the prosecutor led to the arrest of 
John Paul Fazzio 
The court also finds that the defendant's claim that he should have been charged with a 
misdemeanor instead of a felony is without merit because there is no evidence that the defendant 
is a person licensed to sell iodine. The mere fact that the defendant received a farrier's license 
from a private school or a certificate of completion of a farrier's course in Oklahoma does not 
qualify him as a person licensed to engage in a regulated transaction within the meaning of the 
controlled substances act 
C. Failure to include a "Long" instruction: The defendant claims Margret Taylor provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel by not requesting a Long jury instruction at trial. Trans, at p. 8. 
First of all, Margret Taylor was not the defendant's counsel at trial. The defendant terminated 
her employment more than two months prior to the beginning of the trial. Margret Taylor was 
not obligated to provide a jury instruction to the court for a former client. 
Second, a Long jury instruction cautions the jury as to the pitfalls of eyewitness 
identification. State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). However, no reference to any specific 
witness is made in the defendant's memorandum and the court is left to speculate why such an 
instruction should have been given. 
D. Waiver of Preliminary Hearing: The defendant claims that his previous counsel was 
ineffective because she had the defendant waive preliminary hearing. He argues that had the 
preliminary hearing not been waived, the court would have concluded that under the doctrine of 
Ejusdem Generis that as a licensed farrier, the defendant did not commit a violation of Section 
58-37c-l 1, but rather committed a violation of Section 58-37c-19, a misdemeanor. Trans, at p. 9. 
In making the above claim, the defendant presupposes that he is a licensed farrier and 
therefore legally entitled to sell iodine to another person, thus falling within the purview of 
Section 58-37c-19. There was no evidence presented at trial that the defendant has a license that 
entitles him to resell iodine. The defendant uses the term "licensed farrier" when the only 
evidence presented at trial with regard to being a licensed is a certificate of completion of a 
farrier school in Oklahoma. There was no evidence presented at trial to show that the certificate 
qualifies the defendant to re-sell iodine under the Utah Controlled Substances Act. 
II. Unfair Trial 
The defendant asserts prejudicial error by being forced to act as his own attorney at the time 
of trial. Specifically, the defendant claims that on January 19, 2005, the court misled him into 
believing that counsel would be appointed immediately upon his filing of an Affidavit of 
Indigency. The defendant has not provided a transcript, affidavit, or other evidence to support 
this assertion. The defendant did not submit the Affidavit of Indigency to the court until it was 
faxed to the court on January 24, 2005, at 11:30 p.m. The court did not see the affidavit until the 
day of trial - January 26, 2005, at which time the court found that it was submitted untimely and 
declined to appoint counsel at that time. 
It is significant to note that after Ms. Margret Taylor's services were terminated on 
November 18, 2004, the court ordered the defendant to appear before the court on several 
occasions to advise the court on his progress on hiring counsel. Each time the court admonished 
the of the importance of employing counsel but defendant procrastinated the hiring of counsel 
even though he was working in the coal mines. 
Lastly, the defendant claims that, because the defendant was representing himself, the court 
should have assisted the defendant by invoking the exclusionary rule with regard to witnesses on 
defendant's behalf and by making objections to evidence on defendant's behalf. The court 
rejects these assertions as not being the law even though the defendant was pro se. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion for New Trial is denied. 
DATED this 27th day of May, 2005. C~3Uc^<^^f^ 
/ Esryce K. Bryner, 
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Briefs and Other Related Documents 
This case was not selected for publication in the 
Federal Reporter.Please use FIND to look at the 
applicable circuit court rule before citing this 
opinion. Tenth Circuit Rule 36.3. (FIND CTA10 
Rule 36.3.) 
United States Court of Appeals,Tenth Circuit. 
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Michael F. LOY, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 04-3444. 
Jan. 25, 2006. 
Background: Defendant was convicted in the 
United States District Court for the District of 
Kansas on a plea of guilty to one count of mail 
fraud, two counts of wire fraud, and one count of 
interstate transportation of stolen property, and was 
sentenced to 63 months' imprisonment, followed by 
two years of supervised release, and ordered to pay 
$239,752 in restitution. Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Stephen H. 
Anderson, Circuit Judge, held that: 
1(1) defendant's guilty plea was knowing and 
voluntary, and not the product of fear or 
intimidation, and 
2(2) defendant's stubborn failure to hire an attorney 
in connection with the guilty plea was a knowing 




[1] Criminal Law 110 €==>273.1(1) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XV Pleas 
110k272 Plea of Guilty 
110k273.1 Voluntary Character 
110k273.1(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Defendant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, 
and not the product of fear or intimidation; district 
court found, based on its observation of defendant 
throughout the entire proceeding, that the defendant 
was not intimidated, but rather, was confident and 
sure of himself at each court proceeding. 
[2] Criminal Law 110 €=>641.4(4) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XX Trial 
110XX(B) Course and Conduct of Trial in 
General 
110k641 Counsel for Accused 
110k641.4 Waiver of Right to Counsel 
110k641.4(4) k. Validity and 
Sufficiency, Particular Cases. Most Cited Cases 
Criminal Law 110 €=>641.7(1) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XX Trial 
HOXX(B) Course and Conduct of Trial in 
General 
110k641 Counsel for Accused 
110k641.7 Affirmative Duties in 
Protection of Right 
110k641.7(l) k. In General; Advice, 
Preliminary Inquiry and Appointment by Court. 
Most Cited Cases 
Defendant's stubborn failure to hire an attorney in 
connection with a guilty plea was a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of the right to assistance of 
counsel; defendant, an educated professional with 
some familiarity with the workings of the judicial 
system, repeatedly assured the court that he was in 
the process of retaining counsel, only to appear at 
the next scheduled court appearance without such 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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an attorney, and he was permitted to represent 
himself only after the court warned defendant 
repeatedly of the dangers inherent in representing 
himself, cautioned him not to do so, and inquired 
whether the decision he was making was voluntary. 
*747 Lan G. Metzger, Office of the United States 
Attorney, Wichita, KS, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 
Kurt P. Kerns, Ariagno, Kerns, Mank & White, 
Wichita, KS, for Defendant-Appellant. 
Before HENRY, ANDERSON, and O'BRIEN, 
Circuit Judges. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT™* 
FN* This order and judgment is not 
binding precedent, except under the 
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, 
and collateral estoppel. The court 
generally disfavors the citation of orders 
and judgments; nevertheless, an order and 
judgment may be cited under the terms and 
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.STEPHEN 
H. ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 
**1 Defendant Michael F. Loy pled guilty, *748 
pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of mail 
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, two counts 
of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and 
one count of interstate transportation of stolen 
property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. He was 
sentenced to sixty-three months' imprisonment, 
followed by two years of supervised release, and 
was ordered to pay $239,752.32 in restitution. 
Loy's subsequent motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
was denied by the district court. He appeals that 
denial. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
On October 21, 2003, a twelve-count indictment 
charged Loy, a certified public accountant, with 
various counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, money 
laundering, forging an endorsement on a security, 
and interstate transportation of stolen property.™1 
In early plea negotiations with the government prior 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
to his indictment, Loy was represented by attorney 
John Ambrosio. 
FN1. More specifically, Loy was charged 
with one count of mail fraud, two counts of 
wire fraud, three counts of money 
laundering, two counts of forging an 
endorsement on a security, and four counts 
of interstate transportation of stolen 
property. 
Loy made his first appearance before Magistrate 
Judge Karen Humphreys on November 5, 2003. 
Attorney Chris Meek appeared with Loy but did not 
enter an appearance. Loy informed the court that 
he was in the process of retaining Meek as his 
counsel. Magistrate Judge Humphreys scheduled 
the case for arraignment on November 12, 2003, in 
order to accommodate Meek's schedule. 
Loy appeared at his arraignment on November 12, 
accompanied by Assistant Federal Public Defender 
Timothy Henry. Henry did not enter his 
appearance. When questioned by the court 
concerning counsel, Loy represented that he would 
finalize his arrangements for retention of counsel by 
the following Friday. Magistrate Judge Humphreys 
informed Loy that he should "feel free to call Mr. 
Henry" if he needed help obtaining counsel. R. 
Vol. II at 154. The magistrate judge continued the 
arraignment until November 19. On November 19, 
Loy had still not retained counsel, so the 
arraignment was again continued, this time until 
December 3, 2003. 
Meanwhile, on November 13, 2003, the district 
court issued a General Order of Discovery and 
Scheduling, providing for a trial date of January 13, 
2004. 
On December 3, 2003, Loy appeared before 
Magistrate Judge Donald Bostwick for arraignment, 
and he again was without counsel. The magistrate 
judge asked Loy if he was "going to be able to 
retain counsel." Id at 158. Loy responded, "[y]es, 
Your Honor. I apologize for the delay." Id at 
158-59. The magistrate judge expressed concern 
that the delay in retaining counsel would make it 
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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difficult for the attorney to adequately represent 
Loy at trial. When Loy asked whether an attorney 
could enter an appearance at a later date, the 
magistrate judge responded that an attorney could 
enter an appearance at any time. When the 
magistrate judge asked Loy if he was prepared to 
proceed to arraignment, Loy responded that he was 
comfortable proceeding by himself. 
The magistrate judge accordingly proceeded with 
arraignment, informing Loy in detail of the charges 
against him, to which he pled not guilty. At the 
conclusion of the arraignment proceedings, the 
magistrate judge told Loy: 
**2 I cannot say to you more emphatically that you 
need to get an attorney and get an attorney 
immediately because things are going to start[ ] 
rolling very fast *749 with [district court] Judge 
Brown and if you don't get an attorney, we're going 
to get into some real problems in this case. 
Id at 168-69. When asked whether the retention of 
Meek as Loy's counsel was imminent, Loy 
responded that Meek would be retained "[w]ithin 
the next week." Id at 169. Meek did not, 
however, enter an appearance as counsel. 
On December 18, 2003, the district court granted 
the government's motion to set a status conference 
and scheduled the conference for December 29, 
2003. Loy failed to appear at the conference on the 
29th, but because there was some question whether 
he had received notice of the conference, the status 
conference was rescheduled for December 31, 
2003. On December 31, Loy appeared at the status 
conference before the district court with Assistant 
Federal Public Defender Steve Gradert, whom the 
court had asked to attend to assist Loy as needed. 
At this hearing, the district court asked Loy if he 
had obtained counsel, to which Loy replied that he 
was meeting with Meek the following Tuesday to 
finalize arrangements for representation. Loy also 
informed the court that he could afford counsel. 
The district court informed Loy that an attorney 
would be appointed for him if he could not afford 
one, but that if he could afford an attorney, he 
would either have to hire counsel or represent 
himself. The court further reminded Loy that he 
was an educated man with experience in the court 
system, and that he faced a maximum penalty of 
twenty years on many counts of the indictment, and 
ten years on another one. 
The court then postponed the status conference until 
January 2, 2004, instructing Loy to have his 
attorney present at that conference. The court 
further told Loy "if you don't have an attorney or 
can't tell me what you're going to do about this by 
that time, bring your toothbrush," and it 
admonished Loy "[a] man of your intellectual ] 
background and experience gets very little tolerance 
from me when they don't exercise that and common 
sense and do what you're supposed to do. Playing 
around with the Federal courts is not going to work. 
Do you understand?" Id at 188. Loy responded 
that he understood. Gradert stated, "I know Mr. 
Loy had meant no disrespect to the Court. He's had 
financial difficulties that have prevented him from 
being able to get counsel retained, but he's taken 
care of those financial requirements, and I think it 
shouldn't be a problem at this time." Id at 189-90. 
FN2 
FN2. The government also informed the 
court at the December 31 status conference 
that it was having difficulty contacting 
Loy, inasmuch as his home telephone had 
been disconnected and Loy repeatedly 
failed to answer his cell phone. 
At the January 2, 2004, status conference, Loy 
again informed the court that he did not have 
counsel. An assistant public defender told the 
court that Loy was attempting to sell some property 
to obtain the necessary funds and that the sale 
would be complete by the following Monday. Loy 
told the court that, as of then, he lacked the money 
to pay an attorney. The court accordingly 
appointed Mike Hepperly, a member of the panel of 
attorneys available to be appointed by the court to 
represent defendants who cannot afford counsel 
under the Criminal Justice Act ("CJA"), 18 U.S.C. § 
3006A, to represent Loy. Hepperly entered his 
appearance as appointed counsel. Loy informed 
the court that he had discussed personally retaining 
Hepperly after he obtained sufficient fluids. The 
court then scheduled another status conference for 
© 2006 Thomson/West No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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January 5,2004. 
**3 Represented by Hepperly, Loy appeared at the 
January 5 status conference *750 and filed a motion 
to continue the trial. The district court granted a 
120-day continuance. Hepperly informed the court 
that he had discussed with Loy the financial 
affidavit Loy would need to file to retain appointed 
counsel and discovered that Loy did not qualify for 
appointed counsel because his annual income was 
between $80,000 and $100,000. Hepperly thus 
told the court that he had advised Loy not to fill out 
the financial affidavit because "[h]e clearly makes 
too much income and has too many assets ... to be 
able to have a CJA ... lawyer." R. Vol. II at 237. 
Loy again stated that he wanted to retain Hepperly 
once he had sufficient funds to pay him. Trial was 
rescheduled for May 18, 2004. The court scheduled 
another status conference for January 13. 
At the January 13 status conference, Hepperly told 
the court that he had not yet been personally 
retained by Loy, and that he was still a 
CJA-appointed counsel. Hepperly asked that the 
status conference be continued for a week so he 
could clarify his status as Loy's counsel. The court 
again urged Loy to obtain counsel, stating "time's 
running out for you to get somebody to get in here 
and give you the representation that you-any 
defendant deserves." Id. at 246-47. The court 
continued the status conference until January 20, 
stating "[a]nd at that time, 111 expect you to have 
counsel in view of your statements that you're able 
to pay for counsel." Id. at 247. The following 
exchange then occurred between the court and Loy: 
THE COURT: Once more. Again, I'm continuing 
this case in abundance of precaution to see that you 
have adequate counsel. 
DEFENDANT LOY: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: If that isn't arranged, then we're-you 
have two alternatives; you'll be representing 
yourself or your very adequate counsel retained. 
DEFENDANT LOY: Yes, sir, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And as I told you, I don't 
recommend you represent yourself. 
DEFENDANT LOY: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Even as well trained as you are and 
the background as a CPA and as a person familiar 
with the workings of our judicial system. 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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Id at 247-48. 
At the January 20, 2004, status conference the court 
asked Loy and Hepperly if arrangements for 
counsel had been made and was told that they had 
not been. When asked by the court for an 
explanation, Loy responded, "Your Honor, I'm not 
yet able to retain Mr. Hepperly, and so I'm ready to 
proceed today representing myself, Your Honor." 
Id. at 252. The following exchange then occurred: 
THE COURT: Well, we've gone over that before, 
and 111 remind you of all the things we had told 
you-Judge Bostwick told you, but you-you're ready 
to proceed on your own behalf? 
THE DEFENDANT: (Nodded head up and down.) 
THE COURT: All right. For your services, Mr. 
Hepperly, I will make whatever arrangements are 
necessary. 
MR. HEPPERLY: Certainly, Your Honor. 
**4 THE COURT: I appreciate your services. 
And I just want to remind you, Mr. Loy, that any 
pretrial motions are to be filed by April 26th of 
2004. The trial is set for May 18th of 2004, and 
we will go to trial on that day. If you have any 
discovery or need anything in the way of-for your 
own defense, why, you should let us know. 
Judge Bostwick went over very carefully with you, 
didn't he, the problems *751 about your pro se 
representation and the dangers that are involved 
with it? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor, he did. 
THE COURT: You're well aware of them, I take it. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, and he said that I 
was allowed to add counsel any time during 
proceedings. 
THE COURT: You can, but that will not be-will 
not be for the purposes of delay. 
THE DEFENDANT: Correct. That's correct, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Have you ever represented yourself 
in a criminal case? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I've explained to you the 
punishment if you're found guilty in this case and 
what it is, you understand. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And have you ever had anything to 
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do with the guidelines? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, the library is where you can 
find them. You know that. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You know you're on your own, that 
the Court can't help you. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor, that's 
correct. 
THE COURT: Have you had any experience with 
the federal rules of criminal behavior-evidence? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: They will apply to your case and 
what your evidence may be. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, like we've said before, and 
I've told you I think it is my opinion that a trained 
lawyer would defend you far better than you can 
represent yourself. I think it's unwise for you to try. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Of course you are familiar with 
certain phases of the law, the tax law. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You're a CPA and accountant. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: That's-and while that has some 
elements of criminal problems with it that you are 
probably familiar with, I don't think you've had 
anything to do with the rules of evidence before, 
have you? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, we've all told you we don't 
think you should represent yourself, and I don't 
think repeating it here is going to do any good. 
THE DEFENDANT: Understood, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And is your decision entirely 
voluntary? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Due to all the things I've previously 
told you, Judge Bostwick has told you, your 
attorney has probably told you, the government's 
advised you about, you still desire to represent 
yourself and give up your right to be represented by 
a lawyer. 
**5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And your decision again is entirely 
voluntary. 
THE DEFENDANT: That is correct. 
THE COURT: Well, I find the defendant has 
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knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to 
counsel, and I will *752 therefore permit the 
defendant to represent himself. 
You understand again when all motions in this case 
must be filed. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And when the trial is going to be. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I've done this many times before 
with people. I do want to indicate to you I've never 
had one acquitted who represented himself. 
THE DEFENDANT: I understand, sir. 
Id. at 252-56. Hepperly then gave Loy a letter 
indicating that Hepperly no longer was Loy's 
counsel. 
On April 19, 2004, the government filed a motion 
to continue the trial. The district court scheduled a 
status conference for May 3 to consider the motion 
to continue. Loy failed to appear at the May 3 
conference, but telephoned the clerk's office to 
inform the court that he was having problems with 
his car and would be unable to attend. After 
discussing the government's conflicts with the May 
18 trial date previously set, the court granted the 
motion to continue the trial until June 29,2004. 
On June 24, during a scheduled change of plea 
hearing,™3 Loy told the court that he had 
discussed a plea agreement with the government, 
but was not prepared to enter into it at that time. 
On June 29, the day scheduled for the 
commencement of the trial, Loy failed to appear. 
The government told the court that the FBI agent 
assigned to the case had received a call at 10:00 
p.m. the night before (June 28) from Darla 
Peterson, Loy's girlfriend, stating that Loy had 
checked into the hospital with chest pains and 
would not be appearing in court on the 29th. 
Government counsel observed that, while it was 
possible Loy had a heart attack which prevented his 
appearance at trial, it was also possible that this was 
another ploy to delay the proceedings. The court 
then acquiesced in the government's request to issue 
a forty-eight hour bench warrant for Loy, to allow 
an investigation into Loy's alleged medical 
problems. The court also issued a subpoena to 
obtain Loy's medical records from the hospital and 
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from Loy's physician. On July 1, 2004, an arrest 
warrant was issued for Loy. On July 3, Loy 
voluntarily surrendered to the Sedgwick County 
detention facility. 
FN3, Apparently, on June 14, government 
counsel, Assistant United States Attorney 
Metzger, contacted the court and informed 
the court that the parties had reached a 
plea agreement. Accordingly, the court 
scheduled a change of plea hearing for 
June 24. 
On July 6, Loy appeared with Gradert before 
Magistrate Judge Bostwick for a hearing on whether 
Loy's failure to appear at his trial was a violation of 
the conditions of his pretrial release. The 
following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT: ....Before I go any further, you have 
said throughout these proceedings that you wish to 
proceed without a lawyer or you were retaining a 
private lawyer. 
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. As I recall, you appeared 
first in front of Judge Humphreys and told her you 
were going to retain Mr. Christopher Meek and it 
was a matter of selling some real estate and you 
would get him hired. 
**6 [THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor. I 
was told that I didn't qualify earlier because of my 
income but my income has changed drastically and 
therefore I think I might qualify now, sir. 
THE COURT: Did you sell the real estate? 
*753 [THE DEFENDANT]: No sir. I actually 
didn't have the real estate in my name. It was 
family that was trying to get the funds. 
THE COURT: So are you asking me now to 
consider the appointment of counsel for you? 
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I have a Financial Affidavit Form 
which bears your signature and today's date. 
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you recall providing information 
concerning your assets, your employment and your 
income to Pretrial Services before the hearing 
today? 
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Was everything that you told them 
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about your income, your assets, your expenses and 
your employment true and correct? 
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. It indicates here that 
through June of this year ... [y]ou earned a total of 
$23,000. 
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Who is ML & Company? 
[THE DEFENDANT]: That's an accounting firm 
there in Pittsburgh that I and my brother own. 
THE COURT: So you own an ownership interest in 
that firm? 
[THE DEFENDANT]: Well, I have, yes, an 
ownership interest in that firm; yes, sir. 
THE COURT: [C]an you tell me what you believe 
your half interest in that company is worth today? 
[THE DEFENDANT]: Probably 10 to $20,000, my 
share. 
THE COURT: Now, when you were first 
interviewed by Pretrial Services, you indicated you 
were going to retain your own counsel and at that 
time you told the Pretrial Services officer ... that 
you were earning $8,000 a month from ML & 
Company and that your total monthly expenses 
were three or $4,000. 
[THE DEFENDANT]: That is correct, sir. 
THE COURT: What has changed since that time? 
[THE DEFENDANT]: The publicity surrounding 
my federal indictment has drastically limited the 
ML & Company income. 
THE COURT: And the real estate that you told 
Judge Humphreys you were in the process of selling 
to get cash to retain Mr. Christopher Meek when 
you appeared in front of her in November of 2003, 
you now say is owned by somebody else? 
[THE DEFENDANT]: In the family, yes, sir. It's 
not owned by me. It never was owned by me. 
THE COURT: Who did own it? 
[THE DEFENDANT]: It was my ex-wife and her 
family. Not officially divorced, Your Honor, but 
separated. Have been separated for about six 
years, Your Honor. 
Id. at 326-32. Magistrate Judge Bostwick observed 
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that, had Loy appeared before him the first time 
making these representations concerning his 
financial condition, and if they were correct, Loy 
would probably have been provided appointed 
counsel. However, given the trial schedule, the 
*754 magistrate judge declined to appoint counsel. 
**7 With respect to his failure to appear for trial on 
June 29, Loy testified that he did not appear in court 
because he experienced chest pains the evening of 
June 28 and was admitted to the intensive care unit 
of a hospital for testing and was released on June 29 
at 4:15 p.m. The government responded that Loy's 
hospital records indicated he had normal vital signs 
when he was admitted complaining of chest pains, 
and that a heart catheterization procedure indicated 
that the chest pain was not caused by any cardiac 
condition. The government further informed the 
court that Loy did not call the district court, the 
U.S. Attorney's office or the U.S. Probation Office 
when he was dismissed from the hospital, but 
instead went to a baseball game. The government 
asserted that Loy failed to call anyone on June 30 or 
July 1, and only finally contacted the FBI on the 
evening of July 2.FN4 The magistrate judge found 
that, based on that evidence, Loy violated the 
conditions of his release, and the judge revoked 
Loy's bond and ordered him detained pending trial. 
FN4. There was testimony that Loy left a 
message with the U.S. Attorney's office 
late in the afternoon of July 1, but he failed 
to contact the FBI until the next day. 
Following the hearing before Magistrate Judge 
Bostwick, Loy, accompanied by Gradert, appeared 
in district court for a status hearing. The district 
court observed that the case was set for trial the 
following day, July 7, 2004. Loy requested that, in 
light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 
2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004),™* the court 
appoint counsel to represent him. Gradert indicated 
his willingness to represent Loy, but that he would 
need time to prepare. The government argued that 
Loy was simply trying to delay the trial and that he 
had done the same thing-continually claiming he 
was going to get a lawyer but then failing to do 
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so-in criminal proceedings filed against him by the 
Kansas Securities Commission and in at least two 
civil proceedings. 
FN5. The Supreme Court in Blakely held 
that in a state prosecution the Sixth 
Amendment mandates that the maximum 
permissible sentence for a defendant be 
determined solely on the basis of "facts 
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by 
the defendant." 542 U.S. at 304, 124 S.Ct. 
2531. 
The district court found that the government's 
assertion was accurate and supported by the record. 
It accordingly found that Loy was simply 
employing a tactic to avoid the responsibility of 
trial and to delay or prevent resolution of his case. 
The court then appointed Gradert to serve as 
standby counsel and released Loy to a halfway 
house so he could prepare for his trial to commence 
the next day. 
Meanwhile, earlier that day, Loy and Gradert had 
discussed the possibility of a plea agreement. At 
approximately 4:00 p.m., after government counsel 
and Loy and Gradert had discussed a plea 
agreement for some one and one-half hours, the 
court informed Loy that he had ten minutes to 
decide whether to enter a guilty plea. Shortly 
thereafter, Loy informed the court that he wished to 
plead guilty. The district court accordingly 
reconvened the hearing, and Loy pled guilty to one 
count of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 
, two counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1343, and one count of transportation of stolen 
property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. 
At the plea hearing, with Gradert as Loy's standby 
counsel, the district court reviewed the plea 
agreement with Loy, including the provisions of the 
agreement waiving his right to appeal his conviction 
and sentence and waiving his rights under *755 
Blakely to have sentencing enhancements found by 
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The district 
court reviewed the counts of the indictment and the 
elements of each offense charged. The court 
further reviewed the factual statement contained in 
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the plea agreement and Loy, under oath, admitted 
that the facts contained in the factual statement were 
accurate and truthful. The court reviewed the 
sentencing enhancements specified in the factual 
statement, and Loy admitted that the factual 
statements relating to the sentencing enhancements 
were accurate and truthful. Loy further admitted 
that he knew he had the right to plead not guilty and 
that by pleading guilty he would be giving up any 
possible defenses to the charges against him. The 
court reviewed the other rights Loy would be giving 
up by pleading guilty. Loy admitted that he 
understood that the sentence to be imposed on him 
would be determined "solely by the United States 
district judge and that the United States cannot and 
has not made any promises or representations to 
[him] as to the sentence" he would receive. R. Vol. 
II at 306. Loy further admitted that he had been 
furnished a copy of Blakely, that he had discussed it 
with his standby counsel, that he agreed his 
sentence would be determined according to the 
sentencing guidelines and that he had no questions 
concerning Blakely. He also acknowledged that he 
would not be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, 
and that he had waived any appeal or collateral 
attack on his conviction and sentence. He told the 
court that he had had sufficient time to discuss his 
case, the evidence, and the plea agreement with 
standby counsel and that the agreement was the only 
one he had entered into with the government. 
**8 Loy further admitted he had entered into the 
plea agreement freely and voluntarily, and the court 
reminded him that the court did not later "want to 
hear that you now think that you've been pressured 
into signing this agreement. Have you?" to which 
Loy responded "No, sir." Id. at 311-12. The court 
reviewed the potential penalties faced by Loy, and 
Loy acknowledged that he understood such 
penalties. The court and Loy then had the 
following exchange: 
THE COURT: And, Mr. Loy, you know I'm not 
going to let anybody plead guilty who maintains 
he's innocent. With that in mind, are you telling 
the Court that you're guilty? 
DEFENDANT LOY: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You're not claiming to be innocent? 
DEFENDANT LOY: That is correct. 
THE COURT: And you want to plead guilty and 
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have the Court accept that plea and have the clerk 
enter a plea of guilty; is that right? 
DEFENDANT LOY: Yes, Your Honor. 
Id at 316. Loy accordingly pled guilty to counts 
one, two, three and eleven of the indictment. 
After finding that Loy's plea was freely and 
voluntarily made because Loy was guilty, and was 
not made "out of ignorance, fear, inadvertence, or 
coercion" and was made "with a full understanding 
of its consequences," the court accepted his plea of 
guilty to the four counts. Id. at 319. 
On July 12, 2004, a status conference was held and 
the court issued an order modifying Loy's 
conditions of release to permit him to stay in a 
halfway house for one month. 
On August 4, 2004, attorney Ken Kerns entered an 
appearance in the case. On August 12, the court 
granted Loy's motion to further modify the 
conditions of release so he could remain at liberty 
and work four days a week. On September 3, Loy 
filed a motion for an extension of time to file 
objections to the presentence report ("PSR"), which 
the court granted. 
*756 On September 23, Loy, through counsel, filed 
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He argued 
that he was innocent, that he lacked the intent to 
defraud any of his alleged victims, that he pled 
guilty only to get himself out of jail, that he felt 
intimidated by the district court when he pled guilty, 
and that he felt he had little choice with trial 
scheduled to commence the next day. He further 
claimed that he had never waived his right to 
counsel and did not receive effective assistance of 
counsel, and that his guilty plea was not knowing 
and voluntary but was made out of fear. 
The government responded to Loy's motion to 
withdraw his plea, arguing that the status of Loy's 
legal representation was solely the result of his own 
actions and representations to the court that he 
could and would retain his own attorney, and that 
his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. In his 
reply to the government's response, Loy argued that 
he had too much money to qualify for appointed 
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counsel but not enough to hire his own counsel, and 
that his failure to retain counsel was not a ploy or 
delaying tactic. He further argued that the 
government had failed to provide him with 
discovery as required by a court scheduling order. 
**9 On October 25, 2004, a motion and sentencing 
hearing was held, at which Loy was represented by 
attorney Kerns. Kerns argued that Loy felt 
pressured and coerced and that he entered into the 
plea agreement in order to get out of jail. He 
further argued that Loy got no benefit from the plea 
agreement. Loy presented an affidavit from his 
girlfriend, Darla Peterson, in which she stated that 
she and Loy had attempted to sell 7.8 acres of land 
in Crawford County, Kansas, beginning in February 
2004, but that it had not been sold until July 2004, 
at which time funds from that sale were used to 
retain attorney Kems. FN6 Loy further argued that 
the government had failed to provide him with 
discovery until the Friday before trial, and therefore 
any delay was at least partially the government's 
fault. 
FN6. This property was different from the 
property owned by Loy's "ex-wife" and her 
family, which he had previously told the 
court was available for sale to generate 
funds for an attorney. 
The government proffered that, with respect to the 
discovery issue, at the conclusion of the last status 
conference with Loy in January 2004 the 
government specifically told Loy that several boxes 
of documents were available at the U.S. Attorney's 
office for his review. The government further 
averred that in January 2004 it had notified Loy that 
it would provide him with all the marked trial 
exhibits on the Friday before trial, and they so 
notified him on that Friday. The government also 
argued that Loy received a benefit from the plea 
agreement because the government had agreed not 
to bring additional charges against Loy, including 
tax charges resulting from an active tax evasion 
investigation of Loy. Finally, the government 
argued that Loy's conduct with respect to obtaining 
counsel was a "cat and mouse" game with the 
district court, designed to delay going to trial, that 
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Loy's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, and 
that Loy's demeanor during the plea hearing 
indicated that he was not afraid, intimidated or 
coerced. 
The district court denied Loy's motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea, finding: that Loy "had the financial 
means throughout this case to retain counsel" but 
had "consistently refused to make appropriate 
arrangements with an attorney"; that Loy had " 
purposefully refrained from hiring an attorney" to 
postpone resolution of his case; that Loy had 
refused to file an affidavit supporting appointment 
of counsel until the last minute; that Loy knowingly 
and voluntarily waived the right to assistance*757 
of counsel and voluntarily and knowingly decided 
to represent himself; that the financial affidavit Loy 
finally filed seeking to qualify for appointed 
counsel was "vague, incomplete and in some 
respects false" and that Loy had failed to show he 
was financially unable to obtain counsel; that Loy's 
"belated claim of financial inability was made in 
bad faith for the purpose of obstructing" his 
upcoming trial; that Loy's claim of innocence is " 
flatly contradicted" by his statements under oath at 
the plea hearing and in the plea agreement; that 
granting the motion to withdraw the guilty plea 
would result in prejudice to the government; that 
Loy had delayed more than two months before 
filing the motion to withdraw; that Loy's plea was 
knowing and voluntary; that, based upon the court's 
observation of Loy throughout the entire 
proceeding, Loy was not intimidated but, rather, 
was "confident and sure of himself at each court 
proceeding"; that Loy's claimed lack of 
preparedness for his trial was "due solely to his 
dilatory conduct"; that granting the motion to 
withdraw would result in a tremendous waste of 
judicial resources; that the government had not 
improperly deprived Loy of any discovery; and that 
there was accordingly no fair and just reason to 
permit withdrawal of the plea. Id. at 382-84. The 
court's subsequent written order largely reiterated 
these findings. 
**10 The court then conducted a sentencing 
hearing, at which Loy was sentenced to sixty 
months in prison on counts one, two and three, and 
sixty-three months on count eleven, to be served 
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concurrently with the first sentence, for a total of 
sixty-three months in prison, followed by two years 
of supervised released, and he was ordered to pay 
$239,752.32 in restitution. After Loy filed his 
appeal of that order in our court, the government 
filed a motion in our court to enforce the plea 
agreement. This court then issued an order 
reserving judgment on the government's motion and 
ordering briefing on the merits to proceed. We 
accordingly have this appeal and the government's 
motion before us. 
Loy argues on appeal that the district court erred in 
denying his motion to set aside his guilty plea 
because he is innocent, he was denied counsel, and 
his plea was not voluntary and knowing because it 
was made out of fear. 
DISCUSSION 
[1][2] " 'We review the district court's denial of a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of 
discretion.' " United States v. Yazzie, 407 F.3d 
1139, 1142 (10th Cir.) (en banc) (quoting United 
States v. Jones, 168 F.3d 1217, 1219 (10th 
Cir.1999)), cert, denied, — U.S. — , 126 S.Ct 303, 
163 L.Ed.2d 263 (2005). A court considering 
whether a defendant has presented a "fair and just 
reason for withdrawal" of a guilty plea must 
consider the following factors: 
(1) whether the defendant has asserted his 
innocence; (2) whether withdrawal would prejudice 
the government; (3) whether the defendant delayed 
in filing his motion, and if so, the reason for the 
delay; (4) whether withdrawal would substantially 
inconvenience the court; (5) whether close 
assistance of counsel was available to the 
defendant; (6) whether the plea was knowing and 
voluntary; and (7) whether the withdrawal would 
waste judicial resources. 
Id. (quoting United States v. Sandoval, 390 F.3d 
1294, 1298 (10th Cir.2004) (quotation marks 
omitted)). As indicated in our lengthy recitation of 
the district court's findings and conclusions in the 
hearing on Loy's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 
the court carefully considered all of those factors in 
denying that motion. We agree fully with the 
© 2006 Thomson/West No 
Page 10 
district court's conclusions, as they are amply 
supported by the record, including the district 
court's conclusion that Loy's guilty plea was 
knowing *758 and voluntary, and not the product of 
fear or intimidation. We address additionally only 
the issue of whether Loy had adequate assistance of 
counsel in entering into the plea agreement, 
including the question of whether he knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his right to counsel and decided 
to proceed pro se. 
Loy argues that he did not waive his right to 
counsel, and that his standby counsel was 
inadequate to satisfy the Sixth Amendment's 
requirement of effective assistance of counsel. "To 
ascertain whether [a defendant] knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel, we must 
consider 'the total circumstances of the individual 
case including background, experience and the 
conduct of the accused person.' " United States v. 
Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 164 (10th Cir.1980) 
(quoting United States v. Warledo, 557 F.2d 721, 
727 (10th Cir. 1977)). For such a waiver to be 
valid, it " 'must be made with an apprehension of 
the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses 
included within them, the range of allowable 
punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the 
charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, 
and all other facts essential to a broad 
understanding of the whole matter.' " Id. (quoting 
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24, 68 
S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948)). 
**11 The record in this case reveals that Loy, an 
educated professional with some familiarity with the 
workings of the judicial system, repeatedly assured 
the court that he was in the process of retaining 
counsel, only to appear at the next scheduled court 
appearance without such an attorney. He also 
repeatedly assured the court that he could afford an 
attorney. The district court judge repeatedly 
warned Loy of the difficulties he would encounter 
without an attorney, and, when he represented to the 
court that his financial condition had changed such 
that he thought he would qualify for appointed 
counsel, the court promptly took steps to provide 
such counsel. When it turned out that Loy did not 
qualify for appointed counsel, the court permitted 
him yet more time to make arrangements to retain 
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counsel. Only when Loy appeared yet again 
without counsel and asked to be permitted to 
represent himself did the court conclude that Loy 
had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to 
assistance of counsel, after warning Loy repeatedly 
of the dangers inherent in representing himself, 
cautioning him not to do so, and inquiring whether 
the decision he was making was voluntary. 
"A defendant's right to obtain counsel of his choice 
must be balanced against the need for the efficient 
and effective administration of criminal justice." 
Id. at 166. And while our court has "recognized a 
right of a defendant to proceed without counsel," id 
(further quotation omitted), a defendant 
may not use this right to play a "cat and mouse" 
game with the court ... or by ruse or stratagem 
fraudulently seek to have the trial judge placed in a 
position where, in moving along the business of the 
court, the judge appears to be arbitrarily depriving 
the defendant of counsel. 
Id. (further quotation omitted). We find that Loy 
engaged in just such a "cat and mouse" game. We 
hold that his "stubborn failure to hire an attorney 
constituted a knowing and intelligent waiver of the 
right to assistance of counsel." Id. at 167.FN7 
Loy's conduct. The district court was able 
to witness that entire course of conduct, 
and it clearly found that Loy's statements 
and conduct demonstrated an intelligent 
and knowing waiver of his right to counsel. 
*759 CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the denial 
of Loy's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, we 
GRANT the government's motion to enforce the 
plea agreement and we DISMISS this appeal. 
C.A.IO (Kan.),2006. 
U.S. v. Loy 
164 Fed.Appx. 747, 2006 WL 172366 (C.A.10 
(Kan.)) 
Briefs and Other Related Documents (Back to top) 
04-3444 (Docket) (Nov. 18,2004) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
FN7. Loy argues that the district court 
failed to give proper consideration to 
affidavits filed by Meek and Gradert. His 
standby counsel Gradert filed one, in 
which he expressed his belief that Loy " 
entered into the plea of guilty simply to get 
released on bond.... [He] was extremely 
stressed about the position he was in and 
pled because he felt he had no other option. 
" Gradert Aff. % 11, R. Vol. I at 65. 
Meek also filed an affidavit, describing his 
efforts in attempting to arrange for Loy to 
hire a very experienced attorney who 
charged a minimum fee of $75,000, but 
stating that Loy was never able to "come 
up with enough money." Meek Aff. \ 7, 
id. at 114. Meek also "was concerned 
about him representing himself." Meek 
Aff. f 8, id. Neither of these attorneys 
was able to witness the entire course of 
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